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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on an empirical analysis on how inequality, internal and international
mobility, and exogenous shocks interact with each other. With a focus on Italy, I provide an
important contribution to existing literature on migration and inequality, through a comparative
analysis at the subnational level. This characteristic of my work provides a unique opportunity to
better understand inequality within countries. Using rigorous econometric and spatial techniques,
as well as qualitative material, gathered from case studies and reports from international
organizations, my dissertation contributes to the literature in social sciences on the causes and
effects of inequality and on how it is shaped by state capacity, sudden events like earthquakes,
international and internal mobility, and personal networks. Following the obtained results, I posit
that it is up to local and national governments to implement effective policies of redistribution of
wealth and services to reduce horizontal and vertical inequality. Furthermore, I believe particular
attention should be dedicated to the least wealthy areas of the country, like the Center and the
South, historically and consistently less developed than the North.

To my Mum and Dad, always by my side.

Povera patria
Schiacciata dagli abusi del potere
Di gente infame, che non sa cos'è il pudore
Si credono potenti e gli va bene quello che fanno
E tutto gli appartiene

Povera Patria – Franco Battiato
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Introduction

For decades, social scientists have been interested in understanding the causes of inequality and in
finding successful solutions to reduce it, within and across countries. Researchers have proposed
solutions on how to promote paths of sustainable growth to help the poor exit the poverty trap and
reduce their distance with the highest tiers of the society. The approach followed has differed not
only across disciplines, but also within the same field.
Recently, Economics and Political Science started to interact with each other and other disciplines
(Psychology and Neuroscience, e.g.) and systematically look to the factors that affect inequality
in poor, developing, and developed countries.

This dissertation aims to follow that path and look at both economic and political factors that affect
and interact with inequality. In particular, I focus my attention on the role of internal mobility,
international mobility, and natural disasters and their relationship with each other and with
inequality. I posit that internal mobility and international mobility reduce inequality in receiving
regions and increase it in sending regions. One of my goals is to successfully deal with the problem
of endogeneity that scholars constantly have to deal with, when studying these issues. My work
proposes strategies to help deal successfully with endogeneity. One of these strategies, which I
will analyze in Chapter 3, is the consideration natural disasters (like earthquakes), instead of, for
instance, economic shocks (like currency, or bank crises), as natural disasters are normally
considered as an exogenous, unpredictable shock, not influenced by national politics and policies.
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As mentioned before, Italy is the main focus of this dissertation. The country is divided into twenty
regions (very different from each other, economically, politically and socially) and represents an
interesting and diversified case. In this work, different subnational analyses are developed, taking
into account that Italian regions present wide variation in terms of state capacity, inequality and
development. This approach, as posited by Soifer (2012), allows to incorporate information about
Italy as a whole, along with information about the extent to which differences are present in any
given local context. Italy experienced great incoming and outgoing flows in the last decades and,
given their fragile economic and social structures, some of its regions have experienced issues
dealing with the effects of natural disasters.

I will now provide a brief overview of the dissertation, what lies behind it and the general research
objective. I will then move to a more specific analysis of each paper that is part of this work. All
the chapters include specific information about the research question, the methodology used, and
the general hypothesis. I also include descriptive statistics, when possible, and provide arguments
to show how the papers contribute to the existing literature.

Overview
The general motivation behind this work is to understand how phenomena like migrations and
natural shocks interact with each other and inequality at the national and subnational level in Italy.
The final purpose of the dissertation is to suggest policies that can help Italy to solve the problem
of high inequality within and across its regions and to use migration as a resource and incentive to
recover, in a country suffering an enduring social and economic crisis.
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The research question of this dissertation can be articulated into three different sections:

1.

How is internal mobility affected by different levels of income inequality across the

territories of a country?
2.

How does international mobility affect income inequality in host countries?

3.

How do natural shocks, such as earthquakes, affect internal migrations, at the regional

level?

Too many times, in too many places around the world, immigrants are seen as a threat to stability
and prosperity. I am interested in understanding if, on the contrary, mobility can be seen as
resource and if the regions, or countries, to get penalized are those that lose migrants. One of the
purposes throughout the three chapters is to find a causal relation between inequality and
migrations.

To answer the questions above, I use different methodologies and indicators, which adapt to
different contexts and data availability. The main focus of the paper of this dissertation is Italy and
its regions; I acknowledge that the levels of development of these regions vary greatly and that the
methodology I use needs to adapt accordingly.
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Chapter 1
Determinants of Internal Mobility in Italy: A Panel Data Analysis

Key words
inequality, internal mobility, Italy, North, regions, South

Abstract
Italy has historically suffered a gap between the South (less developed) and the North (more
developed). This gap became accentuated during the crisis of 2007-2008, giving rise to different
patterns of interregional migration. This paper investigates the effects of past migration flows and
income inequality on interregional mobility in Italy. I apply an instrumental-variables approach
using bilateral gross migration flows for the 2007-2016 period to capture the effects of income
inequality on internal mobility in Italy. Previous research shows that life in highly unequal regions
is associated with both increased mistrust and increased anxiety about social status, and people
who live in such regions are reportedly unhappier than people living in more equal areas across
levels of wealth. This study analyzes how interregional migration evolved in the years following
the crisis of 2007-2008 in the twenty Italian regions, as a consequence of past migration flows and
high levels of inequality. The instrumental approach used in the analysis aims to control for the
potential endogeneity between internal mobility and inequality. The results show a positive
relationship between high levels of inequality and interregional out-mobility. These results
indicate the need for the Italian government to design policy that shrinks horizontal and vertical
inequality within and among Italian regions.
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Introduction
This paper focuses on how high inequality at the subnational level is an important driver of bilateral
migration flows in all the twenty regions in Italy. Existing research has considered mobility an
important cause of inequality, but this perspective does not take into account the inverse
relationship. I argue that inequality might instead be an important cause of mobility; specifically,
pre-existing unequal redistribution of income and opportunities across territories might push
people from poorer to richer regions of the country, exacerbating the already existing gap between
developed and developing areas.
Buttrick and Oishi (2017) found that living in regions with high levels of inequality has
psychological consequences for individuals, including increased mistrust and anxiety about the
future and one’s social status. These psychological consequences can help explain the reasons
behind mobility decisions. Specifically, having poor health, living in neighborhoods with high
rates of crime, feeling unhappy, or desiring higher social cohesion may prone individuals to move
somewhere else in an attempt to change these experiences. For example, Bell and Freeman (2001)
found that residents of more unequal regions generally worked longer hours than those of more
equal ones, in an effort to earn higher monetary rewards, indicating that they are willing to dedicate
more effort to increasing their social status. Therefore, inequality seems to have real psychological
consequences that affect individuals’ decisions. However, most times individual effort does not
necessarily translate into social and economic satisfaction. For example, employees’ salaries do
not always reflect the effort dedicated to their work (Buttrick & Oishi, 2017). When this occurs,
high levels of disappointment and frustration might trigger mobility decisions.
Mobility is affected by multiple factors, including personal, environmental, demographic,
and economic aspects. While some of these factors have been studied extensively (e.g., Etzo, 2008
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and 2011, Mussida & Parisi, 2016), there is little research studying the effect of inequality on
internal mobility. Specifically, Edmark (2009) suggests that the lack of proper governmental
policies that foster equitable development could be related to increased mobility. This is especially
relevant in places where there is stark inequality. In fact, internal mobility within a country might
be the result of a number of other economic and social factors. One clear example is Italy.
Internal mobility in Italy has always been an important phenomenon due to the persistent economic
and social differences between the North and the South of Italy (Zamagni, 2008; Bank of Italy,
2010), with Northern regions being consistently wealthier and more developed than Southern
regions (Faini, et al. 1997; Checchi and Peragine, 2010; Gagliardi and Percoco, 2011).
Specifically, residents of Southern regions have a history of internal mobility to Northern regions
in search of more prosperous lives.
While internal mobility has occurred consistently in Italy over the years, two large waves
are particularly notable. The first one, between the 1950s and the 1960s was characterized by great
outflows of people from the South to the North and was mainly due to greater economic
opportunities and lower unemployment rates in the North (Fiaschi & Tealdi, 2018). The second
one, took place in the mid 1990s and was characterized by high levels of inequality across regions.
That is, unlike in the first wave, residents of the South did not necessarily move due to economic
or employment opportunities, but due to the obvious stark differences in welfare/lifestyle between
the regions. Past research has studied the Italian case as an example of how mobility causes
inequality and how it is affected by a number of factors. However, it has not been considered
whether pre-existing inequality can largely drive individuals’ mobility.
Concretely, Etzo (2011) found that Italian regions with higher social and economic
development tend to be more attractive (in terms of quality of life and job offer) than less
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developed regions, and therefore tend to experience higher inflows of citizens. On the contrary,
regions with scarce development tend to suffer lower redistribution of income and higher
unemployment, making them less attractive and more prone to outflows of citizens. Larger
outflows of citizens lead to a widening of the existing gap between the wealthier regions of the
country (typically in the Center/North) and the less wealthy ones (the South and the islands of
Sicily and Sardinia). Importantly, persistent outmobility from less wealthy areas to wealthier ones
might lead to a vicious cycle that hinders the development of the regions that lose citizens, such
that they are unable to offer opportunities and increase wealth. This vicious cycle is not only
problematic for the less developed regions, but has negative consequences for the whole social and
economic system of the country.
Further, already existing differences can be largely accentuated by unexpected economic
events. For example, inequality between Italian regions was strongly aggravated by the financial
crisis of 2007-2008, that had large but uneven repercussions (Etzo, 2011). In fact, while the more
developed North of the country reacted in a fast, efficient way, the regions in the Center-South of
the peninsula –which experienced lower levels of socio-economic development-- suffered
significantly more the consequences of the Great Recession. The result of this event was an
increase in unemployment and inequality in less developed regions and, thus, an increase in the
out-mobility to regions that offered better economic opportunities and where the redistribution was
less uneven. According to Etzo (2011), this extreme example constitutes evidence of how different
factors can lead to increased mobility. However, even though Etzo (2011) posited that both
inequality and mobility increased in Italy after the Great Recession due to a number of economic
and social factors, like different demographics, unemployment rates, and population size, he did
not consider that inequality could also be one of the causes of mobility.
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As mentioned above, inequality is affected by multiple factors and has a number of
consequences. For example, personal perceptions of inequality, such as noticing stark welfare
differences between the North and the South can lead citizens to move to more prosperous regions,
without necessarily being driven by general economic factors. In other words, inequality in and of
itself could be driving some of the decisions to move. This reasoning is supported by Harris and
Todaro (1970)’s rural- urban model, according to the which increased out-mobility from highly
unequal areas to low-inequality ones has important consequences for the future levels of
inequality. This is because out-mobility hinders the already precarious development of
disadvantaged regions and exacerbates existing differences between the haves and have nots,
contributing to the development of a permanent gap between rich and poor that cannot be
adequately closed without appropriate redistributive policies, such as investments in health,
education, and creation of employment. Given that mobility is largely studied as one of the causes
of inequality, it is of interest for the field to understand whether, in some instances, mobility is in
fact the result of inequality. This crucial theoretical difference is necessary to understand, among
other things, how governments should implement redistribution policies. That is, if inequality is
indeed what causes mobility (hindering in turn the development of the sending regions), then
redistribution policies should be aimed at reducing existing levels of inequality, preventing thus
out-migrations.
Another factor that existing literature has discussed is the importance of interpersonal
networks in affecting migrations. For instance, Piras (2020) investigates the role of migration
networks at internal level in Italy and compares them with the same phenomenon in the United
States. Piras’ findings prove that network effects play a crucial role in explaining migration flows
at internal level. The same issue has been analyzed by several scholars in the past who reached the
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same conclusion: migration networks (also known as diasporas) as a key determinant of migration
flows. Literature has extensively shown that moving costs are generally lower when migrants can
count on an existing network of people at the target destination (Munshi 2016; Beine et al. 2011,
2015; Bakewell et al. 2016; Garip and Asad 2015; King 2012a, b; Haug 2008; Amuedo-Dorantes
and Mundra 2007).
Networks are important as they provide migrants useful information to nudge a smooth
transition from home to a new destination; for instance, networks can provide insights on available
jobs and accommodation and, once established, become a sort of self-perpetuating mechanism
(Massey et al., 1993).
In the next sections, I will provide an overview of supporting literature on internal mobility
and inequality, illustrate the methods and models used to conduct the analysis, and discuss in detail
the obtained results.

Literature Review
Pickett and Wilkinson (2015) have labeled inequality a cause of insecurity and asymmetric
accumulation of wealth, driven by the non-inclusiveness of technological development. Especially
in rich, developed countries, inequality compromises the stability of socio-economic systems, both
nationally and locally. In the last decade, protests against economic inequality have erupted in
many countries around the world (Solt, 2015). Although inequality has been the target of many
protests around the world, interestingly, it has not been studied in the context of another important
phenomenon that has historically shaped and altered socio-economic systems in different
countries: internal mobility.
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Internal mobility is important because it can shape the social and economic structure of a
country, especially if the country is heterogeneous, with important differences across areas and
social classes. This is specifically relevant in the case of Italy, a country that has historically
experienced, and is still experiencing, significant internal mobility and high levels of regional
inequality (compared to other developed countries), mostly due to different levels of development
between the North and South of the country, resulting in income inequality.
While internal mobility might be affected by income inequality, mobility is also strongly
influenced by its perception among citizens. For example, Rotte and Vogler (1998) established
that perceptions of relative poverty trigger migrations more than poverty in areas when poverty
levels are equal across the population, suggesting that “there is a higher incentive to migrate if one
is poor among rich than if one is poor among poor”. In these cases, income inequality could act as
a push factor. Push and pull factors in geography refer to the causes of mobility among people.
Specifically, Kimutai (2017) describes push factors as factors that drive people away from a
particular environment due to unsustainable conditions, such as insecurity or unemployment.
Instead, pull factors attract people to a particular environment due to desirable factors, such as
security, employment, and political stability and climate. The reasons behind these factors can be
social, economic, environmental or political in nature. While inequality can be a push factor, it can
also be intended as a pull factor; specifically, high-skilled potential migrants may be attracted to
countries, or regions, where their skills are adequately rewarded and where the gap between the
wealthy and the poor is not as substantial. To this respect, the case of Italy represents a good
example. Average salaries, productivity, and career opportunities are higher in the North of Italy
than in the South, making Northern regions more attractive to people in search of good
opportunities (Aiello & Scoppa, 2001).
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Generally, Italy constitutes a relevant case study of regional inequality and internal
mobility, because it has experienced important flows of migrations from poorer to richer areas in
the last decades, due to both economic and non-economic reasons (Etzo, 2008). For example,
Cannari et al. (2010) and Mocetti and Porello (2010) found that factors like house prices,
employment rates, and immigration from abroad all play an important role in internal migrationdecision making in Italy. For example, when they have the means to, individuals and families tend
to move to regions where rates of unemployment are lower, housing is more affordable, and
immigration is low (Simpson, 2017). These factors are in turn influenced by other aspects that
influence decisions of mobility, such as distance. According to Biagi et al. (2011), long-distance
mobility is determined by economic factors, while short-range mobility is related to quality of life
and amenities. Therefore, mobility in Italy is influenced by a number of economic and noneconomic factors and is driven by distance.
While a number of factors are known to affect mobility based on previous research, this is
mostly based on studies that focus on South-North mobility, without considering more
heterogeneous routes, such as bilateral flows across the twenty Italian regions (Fiaschi & Tealdi,
2018). This is a limitation because it does not take into consideration all the possible movements
across the country. For this reason, it is important to consider bilateral mobility flows and studying
each of the twenty Italian regions as both origin and destination of internal mobility.
Specifically, one important factor necessary to understand inequality is unemployment. A
number of studies (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Withers & Pope, 1985; Sato, 2004) have found that
high unemployment rates are an important factor for mobility decisions. This is in line with
standard economic theory claims suggesting that larger employment disparities among regions
imply higher migration flows (Greenwood, 1975; Greenwood & Hunt, 1984). While this is an

11

extended view, Faini et al. (1997) did not find support for the theory’s claims. In their study they
showed that increasing unemployment differentials between the North and the South of Italy were
associated with lower migration flows and high mobility costs between 1970 and 1990 (i.e., the
years between the two large mobility waves mentioned above), indicating that inter-crisis periods
might not follow standard mobility trends. Thus, more research is needed to understand the effect
of unemployment on internal mobility, in both sending and receiving regions.
Another important factor with respect to mobility is the level of skills and education of the
migrants. For example, during the first large wave of migrations (1950s-1970s) that Italy
experienced, most citizens moving from the South to the North were individuals with low levels
of education (i.e., elementary school or middle school diploma), migrating in search of
employment in the primary and secondary sector (Fratesi & Percoco, 2014). These years
corresponded to the Italian Economic Boom that resulted in a change from a mostly rural country
to one of the most important industrial powers in the world, mainly due the level of development
achieved in the North (Zamagni, 1993). On the contrary, the second wave of internal migration
that Italy experienced (mid 1990s) was characterized by high-skilled individuals with higher levels
of education (i.e., high-school or university degrees) in search of employment in the tertiary sector
that was more prominent in the north of Italy (Etzo, 2011). In fact, a report from the Bank of Italy
(2005) about mobility during the second wave, “while only 7% of the total working-age population
in the South has a degree, 25% of migrants from the South to the Center-North has one”, suggesting
that most individuals with higher degrees in the South moved to the North during this wave, likely
driven by the inability to achieve their the needs and desires in the South of Italy.
One of the needs of people with higher education is to earn wages that are proportional to
the time and the money spent to obtain their degrees. Etzo (2008, 2011) proposed that the mobility

12

flows during the second wave of the mid-1990s were largely due to the desire of educated people
from the South to move to regions with higher GDP per capita (i.e., Northern regions) that allowed
them to meet social and economic satisfaction. Thus, by moving to the Northern regions, migrants
could have access to higher wages, better opportunities, and excellent levels of industrial
development (Percoco, 2018).
All the factors that contribute to mobility from less developed to more developed regions
of Italy fall within the rural-urban model developed by Harris and Todaro (1970). The model
attempts to explain that the industrial development that characterized increased labor supply in the
Northwest of Italy gave the opportunity to people living in the South (which remained essentially
rural) to see their labor demand satisfied in the North. As a result, most of the labor demand from
the South moved to the North, therefore the already existing inequality between the North and
South increased steadily through the years.
While a number of factors are known to affect mobility based on previous research, this is
mostly based on studies that focus on South-North mobility, without considering more
heterogeneous routes, such as bilateral flows across the twenty Italian regions (Fiaschi & Tealdi,
2018). This is a limitation because it does not take into consideration all the possible movements
across the country. For this reason, it is important to consider bilateral mobility flows and study
each of the twenty Italian regions as both origin and destination of internal mobility.
Thanks to its geographical and administrative structure, the case of Italy can help explain
the relationship between inequality and internal mobility. The stark differences between the North
and the South of the country constitute a clear example of economic, social, and demographic
inequality. The analysis of inequality as a trigger of mobility is relevant for current theoretical
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frameworks that have not considered inequality a determinant factor of mobility decision-making
in Italy, but only as a result.
In conclusion, the goal of the study is to analyze how pre-existing levels of inequality affect
internal mobility across the twenty regions of Italy, together with other economic and demographic
factors. The final purpose is to suggest policies that could favor equal levels of development in the
most unequal regions to eventually stimulate wealth redistribution across the whole country.

Methods
One important reason behind the choice to analyze internal mobility at the regional level is that
internal migrants are usually easier to capture. This is because unlikely undocumented
international migrants (arriving, in the case of Italy, mostly from the Middle East and North
Africa), they enjoy normal legal status. The censuses and population registers often provide
detailed information about within-country flows, offering the chance to model internal flows as a
function of origin and destinations at relatively fine spatial scales, such as at the regional,
provincial, and even municipal level (Casacchia et al. 2010; Lamonica & Zagaglia 2013). Such
approach allows to focus on questions and methods useful to analyze the structure of the population
and spatial distribution of flows. Previous approaches to the topic include the use of a dynamic
model, where a lagged version of the dependent variable is used as the main regressor to control
for the impact of social networks (intended as migratory phenomena in the recent past as drivers
for today’s mobility) in migration decision-making (Etzo, 2008). This, however, is not the case of
this paper; while acknowledging the relevance of Etzo’s model, here I focus on the analysis of
inequality as the main driver for internal mobility.
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In order to understand the drivers behind internal mobility in Italy, this paper employs a
detailed set of interregional migration data within an empirical framework that considers economic
and social factors at the regional level. Data for this paper were gathered from the Italian Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT), the European Institute of Statistics (Eurostat) and the database Comuni
Italiani (Italian Municipalities), which contain important information on the variables of interest
in Italy at the regional level.
Migration flows in this paper are intended as transfers of residence, throughout the twenty
Italian regions (2007-2016); local population registers and censuses often provide detailed
information about within-country flows, allowing to model internal mobility in terms of origin and
destinations at relatively detailed spatial scales, whether at the regional or provincial level, and, in
some cases, even at the municipal level (Casacchia et al. 2010; Lamonica & Zagaglia 2013).
Thanks to this approach, it is possible to try to assess questions more suited to highly detailed and
large national datasets, thus facilitating the analysis of the population structure, in terms of, among
others, education, unemployment, and income level and the temporal and spatial distribution of
flows.
Figure 1 below represents the trend of interregional migration flows among all twenty
Italian regions in the years between 2007 and 2016. As the graph shows, there is a peak in
migration flows in almost all the regions in 2012. Such increase in migration flows is considered
as a result of the delayed manifestation and long-lasting effects of the financial crisis (Di Quirico,
2010; de Belvis et al., 2012).
Figure 1 here
Figures 2 to 4 below, created using data from the Italian Institute of Statistics, represent
trends of inequality, according to the three different indexes used in the paper. The figures
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highlight how the regions of the south of Italy suffer from higher levels of income inequality,
confirming Impicciatore & Strozza (2016).

Figure 2 here
Figure 3 here
Figure 4 here

Unemployment rates follow a growing pattern all over the country, highlighting how the
negative effects of the Great Recession are suffered everywhere. On average, however, the
unemployment rates in the south of Italy are higher than unemployment rates in the north and
center, consistently with what highlighted by Etzo (2011) and what shown by Istat (2017) and
Eurostat (2017, 2018). Figure 5 below, realized using data from the Italian Institute of Statistics,
offer a graphic representation of the unemployment rates in Italy (2007-2016).

Figure 5 here

The model
OLS
The baseline empirical analysis is based on a standard dynamic OLS model. The dependent
variable of the proposed model is represented by changes of residence from region i to region j,
for each of the twenty regions in Italy over time. The dependent variable was built as a matrix of
interregional dyads, with each region included as both an origin and destination of mobility (Etzo,
2008). As a result, the model employs a total of 3800 observation on gross internal migration
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flows. Panel models account the cross-provincial and overtime dynamics and can be adjusted to
account for omitted variables and individual heterogeneity (Hsiao, 2007).
The model used to describe bilateral migration flows and to identify each of the twenty
Italian regions as both migrants senders and migrants receiver is similar to the model developed
by Etzo (2011), with the exception that Etzo does not consider measures of inequality as one of
the possible causes of interregional migrations in Italy. A list and brief description of all the
variables used in this model is provided:
MFijt = Migration Flows: inflows and outflows to and from each of the 20 Italian regions
from 2007 to 2016;
Ineqt = Inequality Indexes at Origin and Destination: index of inequality level in each of
the 20 Italian regions considered both as senders and receivers of migrants, from 2007 to
2016;
UNRt = Unemployment Rate at Origin and Destination: level of unemployment in each of
the 20 Italian regions considered both as senders and receivers of migrants, from 2007 to
2016;
Popt = Population at Origin and Destination: number of residents in each of the in each of
the 20 Italian regions considered both as senders and receivers of migrants, from 2007 to
2016;
CRt = Crime Rate at Origin and Destination: perception of crime in the neighborhood for
each of the 20 Italian regions considered both as senders and receivers of migrants, from
2007 to 2016;
DegOwnt = Degree owners over the citizens of each of the 20 Italian regions, at time t;
Dij = Distance between each of the 20 Italian regions.
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The model is expressed by the following econometric form:

MFijt = b0 + b1MFijt-1 + b2ODInequalityt-1 + b3ODDemogr.t-1 + b4ODDistanceij + eit

(1)

• MFijt: Bilateral Gross Migration Flows, from region i to j, at time t;
• MFijt-1: Bilateral Gross Migration Flows from region i to j, at time t-1;
• Inequalityt-1: The three different indexes of Inequality used in the paper, at time t-1;
• Demogr.t−1: The one-year lagged demographic explanatory variables above listed, at time t-1;
• Distanceij: Distance between origin and destination region.

As mentioned, the model is dynamic; this means that a lagged version of the dependent
variable is used as independent variable. The main reason to use a dynamic model is to verify the
effect of existing networks and determine whether past migrations have a significant impact on
migrations today (Piras, 2020). The dynamic model used in the paper considers three different
measures of inequality to show robustness given known limitations of the Gini coefficient. As
clearly explained by Mussida and Parisi (2016), the Gini Coefficient is one of the most popular
measures adopted in the literature. However, this index is often criticized, due its sensitivity to
differences (and transfers) in the middle portion of the income distribution, and because of its nonsensitivity to differences in the bottom or upper tails, for instance when very high, or very low
levels of income are observed. Capturing such sensitivity is an important issue, especially when
the analysis aims to observe the distributional effects of an economic crisis. The other two
measures of inequality are the index of relative poverty and the rate of the number of people in the
top 20% of the income scale, over the number of people in the bottom 20% of the income scale
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(the higher the ratio, the lowest the existing level of inequality). The following table provides a
summary of the proxies used in the model for inequality.
Table 1 here
2SLS
In order to control for a potential endogeneity bias, a dynamic instrumental approach is used when
the OLS method is suspected to be inconsistent, due to the potential endogeneity of the regressor
(in this case, regional inequality). This means that, with a simple OLS regression, changes in the
measures of inequality, not only would cause changes in the dependent variable (migration flows)
but also in the error term. An instrumental approach allows the use of instruments which cause
direct changes in the endogenous regressor, but only indirect changes (via the endogenous
regressor) in the dependent variable. The variables chosen for the analysis as instruments for
inequality represent the rate of people who purchase items online, compared to how many people
have access to the internet and the rate of people who go to the theatre, compared to how many
people go to the cinema. The rationale behind this choice is that the two instruments represent
indexes of inequality, as it is relatively easy, nowadays, in a developed country like Italy, to get
access to the internet, or go to the cinema (price are quite low, for instance, for students and the
elderlies, and many cinema offer promotions on ticket on weekdays), but it is not so easy to have
the money necessary to purchase goods online, or to go to the theatre (tickets are rather expensive
and the number of available seats limited). Despite describing a certain level of inequality, it is fair
to assume that the inability to purchase goods online, or to go to the theatre, due to the price of
tickets, represent reasons good enough to nudge people towards migration.
The 2SLS model is expressed by the following econometric form:

19

MFijt = b0 + b1MFijt-1 + b2ODInequalityt-1 + b3ODDemogr.t-1 + b4ODDistanceij + eit

(2)

Inequality = g0 + g1Cinema + g2Theatre + hit

(3)

• MFijt: Bilateral Gross Migration Flows, from region i to j, at time t;
• MFijt-1: Bilateral Gross Migration Flows from region i to j, at time t-1;
• Inequalityt-1: The three different indexes of Inequality used in the paper, at time t-1;
• Demogr.t−1: The one-year lagged demographic explanatory variables above listed, at time t-1;
• Distanceij: Distance between origin and destination region;
• Cinema: Inequality instrument encompassing people who can afford an inexpensive cinema
ticket;
• Theatre: Inequality instrument encompassing people who can afford an expensive theatre ticket;

The instruments used in this model have proven to be poorly correlated with the dependent variable
(Bilateral Gross Migration Flows) and satisfyingly correlated with the three indexes of inequality.
The following table provides a list of the used instruments for inequality, descriptive statistics, as
well their correlation with the dependent variables and the three different inequality measures used
in the model.
Table 2 here
As mentioned before, both models are dynamic, to verify the presence of existing migration
networks and due to the medium-to-long term effect on migrations expected in variables like
inequality and unemployment. To provide more robustness to the models and to verify long-term
effects, the analysis has been carried with models containing two- and five- time lags (tables in the
Appendix). In both OLS and 2SLS models, an important trigger for migrations is represented by
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unemployment rate. I expect very high levels of unemployment to disincentivize mobility from
the origin, as the lack of liquidity and means to leave (resulting from long periods without a job
and a salary) would make mobility rather complicated, given the very high cost of living and
housing in the wealthiest regions. The unemployment rate, in this case, also represents a good
measure of different employment opportunities in different regions (Biagi et al., 2011).
Following the same logic, another one of the explanatory variables used in this model (Education)
has a double purpose. First of all, it is important as it represent a proxy of human capital in the
population , but also as a variable that describe the perception that people have of inequality,
assuming that the higher the level of education, the more people should be aware of inequality
patterns around them. This variable is important, as it is arguable that people would not migrate,
due to inequality, if they were not aware of it (Biagi et al., 2011).
Distance in the model is intended as the linear distance in kilometers among the capitals of
the regions (Etzo, 2008). Previous literature on migration widely recognizes the important role of
distance in migration decision-making (Greenwood, 1997; Cushing & Poot, 2004; LeSage & Pace,
2008). In this paper, following Juarez (2000), distance is also used as a proxy for the general cost
of moving. It is important to notice that even for a relatively small country like Italy, distances are
important, as they connect regions with very different costs of living, thus representing an obstacle
for those individuals or families who do not have enough liquidity to afford moving.
An important demographic variable included in this model is represented by the total
population in each region. Following previous literature, and in particular the equilibrium approach
(Graves, 1976; Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988) mentioned earlier in the paper, the model
includes one amenity-related (or disamenity, in this case) individual variable, represented by the
perception of crime in each region. Such data are provided by annual surveys on the quality of life,
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realized by the Italian Institute of Statistics and aim to make the model more robust and complete,
not limiting the analysis to the mere study of economic drivers of interregional mobility.
All the explanatory variables contain one-time lag. The reason behind this choice is that it
is not easy to see immediate effects of some of the controls of this model on migration (such as
inequality itself, unemployment, and education level), as they produce medium-term effects, rather
than short-term ones. Thanks to this technique, the model analyzes the effects of time-variable
explanatory controls at time t-1 on gross bilateral migration flows at time t.
The analysis takes into consideration the years 2007-2016. While acknowledging the
importance of analyzing longer periods, the choice was driven by the lack of data available for one
of the instruments used in the 2SLS model (Internet Index), for which data are only available from
2007.
With the purpose of increasing the robustness of the model and verify the validity and
reliability of the 2SLS approach, I use four additional different Instrumental Variables Estimators.
These estimators can be used in case of an instrumental approach where the chosen instruments
(which need to be exogenous and weakly correlated with the dependent variable) are not
considered to be strongly enough correlated with the endogenous regressor (Bartolucci et al.,
2018). The table below provides a brief description of the four IV Estimators used in the paper.
Table 3 here

Results
The empirical analysis in the paper was carried through two models: OLS and 2SLS. The
latter was performed given the risk of endogeneity between the dependent variable and the
regressor in the OLS model, which could have provided biased results. The outcome of the OLS
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analysis seems to confirm the initial hypothesis and provides indeed some biased estimates that
can be observed in the table at the beginning of the appendix. The bias is due to the potential
reverse causality between internal mobility and inequality. On the contrary, the 2SLS model
provides consistent results across the three measures of inequality taken into consideration.
The results of the model described in the equation (2) above offer interesting insights. As
expected, all three measures of inequality (Gini Index, Relative Poverty Index and Income Ratio)
show that high levels of inequality at the origin represent a significant push-factor for interregional
outmigration and, at the same time, low levels of inequality at the origin disincentive outmigrations. Conversely, inequality levels at the destination do not represent a significant pullfactor for in-migrations. In both OLS and 2SLS pre-existing migrations (therefore the existence of
migration networks) proved to have a significant positive effect on migrations at time t, as posited
by Piras (2020). The next paragraphs will provide detailed summaries of the results for the 2SLS
model, for each of the three indexes of inequality.

Gini Index
In the case of the Gini index, high levels of inequality at the origin are associated with
higher bilateral migration flows. As in the previous model, long distances disincentive migrations
(with the estimated threshold at about 825 km). The model establishes higher levels of education
at the origin as a significant push-factor for interregional migration in Italy; this result suggests
that migration tends to be high-skilled and that the perception of existing inequality plays a role in
people’s migration decision-making. Results corroborate the hypothesis that people (provided the
presence of enough liquidity) migrate to regions where they believe unemployment is low and
wages are higher. In accordance with literature and the previous models, high perception of crime
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(low quality of life) at the origin represents an important push-factor in people’s migration
decision-making, while high education levels at the destination is a significant pull-factor.

Relative Poverty
The analysis shows that, as mentioned above, inequality at the origin constitutes an
important push-factor for interregional mobility. As expected, distance between regions represents
an obstacle to migration, suggesting that people tend to migrate to regions in proximity to their
home (with the estimated threshold at around 770 km). Financial constraints and the absence of
sufficient liquidity to move far from home might play a role, given the different cost of living and
housing between the North and the South; high rates of unemployment at the origin seem to
disincentive migration, following the results obtained by Biagi et al. (2011). The higher the
perception of crime at the origin, the more people tend to migrate, highlighting how the quality of
life and the perception of safety plays an important role in people’s migration decision-making.
High levels of education in migrant-receiving regions constitute an important pull-factor for
internal mobility.

Income Ratio
The Income Ratio, consistently with the previous two models, suggest that lower levels of
inequality at the origin are associated with lower bilateral migration flows, suggesting that a fair
redistribution of wealth disincentives interregional mobility. As in the previous cases, people are
more attracted by short-distance mobility (estimated threshold at about 826 km) and high levels of
education. People are attracted by regions with low unemployment and higher education,
expecting higher wages and better life conditions. The perceived presence of a disamenity like
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high crime rates (associated with low quality of life) represents a significant push-factor for
outmigration at the regional level.

Tables 4 and 5 below present the detailed results of both OLS and 2SLS models used in this paper.
Table 4 here
Table 5 here
In general, the three different models analyzed in this paper suggest that the included
economic variables (Inequality and Unemployment rate) have an important weight in migration
decision-making at the regional level in Italy, together with the presence of disamenities like high
crime rates. In accordance with existing literature (Etzo, 2008, 2011; Biagi et al, 2011), migration
in Italy is associated with short distances and higher levels of education, highlighting how
migration has evolved through the years, from low-skilled labor (during the 1950s-1970s) to
today’s high-skilled labor.
As anticipated earlier in this paper, an instrumental approach has been used to control for
the possible endogeneity of the three indexes of inequality. The performed endogeneity tests
(results at the bottom of each table) fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instrumented
regressors may be treated as exogenous. In other words, endogeneity does not seem to be a major
problem in this model.
This paper used four additional estimators for instrumental variables (LIML, FULL,
HLIM, and HFUL), in order to provide robustness and corroborate the results obtained by the
instrumental approach, performed through the 2SLS model. The analysis of these additional
estimators confirms the reliability of an instrumental approach, highlighting a better fit for this
analysis, compared to the standard OLS approach, whose results suffer from endogeneity issues.
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Discussion
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effect of regional inequality, together with
economic, social, and demographic factors on mobility at the regional level in Italy. The main
hypothesis was that high levels of inequality would increase bilateral migration flows in the
country. This analysis constitutes a first and explorative attempt to consider inequality as an
important driver for assessing interregional mobility in Italy. The initial results provide some
interesting insights for future research. The positive effect that income inequality at the origin has
on interregional mobility suggest that the perception of the existing gap between rich and poor
represents a driver for mobility at the regional level. This means that wealth redistribution policies
can shape the social and economic setup of the different regions of a country and exacerbate, or
shrink existing levels of inequality (Zhang et al., 2019). To this respect, for future analysis, it
would be interesting to analyze inequality from a different point of view, taking into consideration
the first and ninth decile of the population, in terms of income level, and verify their effects on
regional migrations. Unemployment provides interesting information about migrations. When
unemployment levels at the origin are very high, people migrate less. These results seem to confirm
what previous literature reports about the importance of conditional cash transfers (Angelucci, M.,
2012), social networks (Epstein, GS., 2004), and remittances (Garcia, A.I.L., 2018), with respect
to mobility. In accordance to what emerged from the analysis of levels of unemployment, results
also suggest that distance is a factor in the evolution of migration trends and that people tend to
migrate to regions that are closer to their homeland, even if these regions might not be the solution
in terms of improvement of the quality of life.
Distance is an important factor, with respect to migration decision-making in Italy; people
tend to avoid moving to places that are further than around 800 km (500 miles) away from the
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homeland. This result suggests the necessity to hold enough liquidity to move from one place to
another and, as claimed by the equilibrium model approach, that people tend to migrate to adjacent
or close regions, for reasons that are not strictly economic, but also personal, climatic and
environmental (Etzo, 2011; Biagi et al., 2011). Last, but not least, I posit, in accordance with
existing literature, that the presence of existing personal networks nudge migrations, as it helps
migrants adjusting to a new life in the target destination, providing information on jobs and
housing, among others (Piras, 2020). This paper analyzed a complicated and challenging moment
for the global and the Italian economies: the years after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. All the
results obtained in this paper could be influenced by the uniqueness of the situation. In order to
isolate the effect of the crisis, the model contains time and region-to-region fixed effects. For future
research, it would be convenient to gather data at the regional level for the years before the crisis,
when available. The analysis of interregional migration trends during the years before and after
the recession would help better isolate the effect of the financial crisis and provide more
information on the drivers of interregional mobility in expansionary and recessionary periods.
The paper highlights the important social and political consequences of migration from poor to
wealthy regions and its perception. The results obtained suggest the need of important investments
in areas where inequality and outmigration are high, in order to increase wealth redistribution,
reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and create better living conditions in those regions
that are still suffering the consequences of the Great Recession. The reduction of vertical inequality
within regions would indirectly reduce horizontal inequality among regions, allowing more
uniform levels of development across the country.
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To my knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to analyze how inequality affects
mobility at the subnational level in Italy and it would be instructive to analyze whether similar
patterns can be identified in different contexts such as, for instance, other European countries.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of International Immigration on Inequality in Host Countries: The Case of
Italy
Key words
Immigration, Inequality, Italy, Regions, SUR

Abstract
The phenomenon of international immigration has been studied in depth through the years from
different disciplines, such as law, geography, sociology, medicine, politics, and economics.
Economic studies have analyzed the effect of international immigration on labor markets, on how
it affects economic growth and on public finances. In recent years, the struggle of many people
around the world against the negative, enduring effects of the Great Recession of 2008, enhanced
the rise of anti-immigration, nationalist parties across the world, and especially in Europe.
Immigrants are increasingly identified as the source of today’s issues, i.e. rising poverty and
inequality in host countries. This research aims to analyze the effect of immigration on inequality
in host countries, in order to verify whether immigration exacerbates or reduces the existing gap
among social classes. The paper analyzes the effect of immigration on inequality at the subnational
level in Italy. The results suggest no significant effect of immigration on inequality in Italy. The
economic and the political implications of these mobility flows are discussed at the end.
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Introduction
The purpose of this research is to study whether the role of international immigration on income
inequality in host countries and if so, how the redistribution of income is affected by the presence
and work of immigrants across social classes. By attaining this objective, the paper intends to
contribute to existing literature on the effects of international immigration on inequality within and
between regions in host countries. First, through an analysis of Italy, this research will shed a light
on how immigration produces different results in different political, social and economic systems,
namely the different Italian regions (first tier of subnational division in Italy). Second, the paper
adds to the existing literature by suggesting policies aimed at favoring and improving the
integration of immigrants in Italy, together with equitable development across the country.
Significant waves of immigrants represent a pressing matter for many Western European
countries; researchers and policymakers have tried to understand how immigrants can be
successfully integrated into Western European society, without having to suffer economic and
social discrimination (Hellwig & Sinno, 2017). Issues related to integration are especially urgent
given the rising tensions between the locals and immigrant groups, following the financial crisis
and the recent refugee flows. These phenomena have led to the rise of nationalist movements all
around Europe that advocate for closed borders and for a strong reduction of the number of
immigrants who access the continent, claiming that only the ones escaping wars and terrorism
should be authorized to come to the Europe. According to nationalist movements, the presence of
immigrants, and particularly undocumented immigrants, causes the disruption of the nation state
and the destabilization of its boundaries (Nicholls & Uitemark, 2019).
In this paper, I analyze the specific case of Italy. I argue that immigration has no negative effects
on host economies and societies (when immigrants are successfully integrated), and that is not a
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cause of rising inequalities; I posit that the reasons for rising inequality, insecurity, and the
enduring effects of the recent financial crisis are not caused by immigrants, but other factors, like,
for example, pre-existing inequality and unemployment.
The analysis is performed using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach; the choice lies
behind the potential issues of endogeneity between the two main independent variables of the
model (lagged inequality and immigrants per capita) and the dependent variable (inequality).
Furthermore, a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions allows to estimate allows to simultaneously
estimate the different independent effects of the variables of interest on each of the inequality
measures used in this paper, through inequality-specific explanatory equations. In this case, a
seemingly unrelated approach allows to avoid the issue of potential correlation between betweenand within-region inequality which may be interpreted as components of an overall index of
inequality. This model represents a generalization of a linear regression model that consists of
several regression equations; each regression has its own dependent variable and sets of exogenous
explanatory variables. Each equation is a valid linear regression that can be estimated separately.
The dependent variables that will be analyzed through this approach are within-region inequality
and between-regions inequality. Each of them will be regressed on demographic explanatory
variables both within and between regions. At the same time, the paper will assess the effect that
the two kinds of inequality have on each other in the long term. This model is useful because it
allows error terms in the equations to correlate, unlike the GLM that assumes this unrealistic
hypothesis that the equation errors would be uncorrelated.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the contribution provided by existing literature
on the integration of immigrants in Italy and income inequality. Section 3 provides detailed
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information on the data and methodologies used to perform the analysis. Section 4 highlights the
main results obtained in the paper. Section 5 provides conclusion and policy suggestions.

Theoretical Support
There are important differences across countries in the way labor markets are regulated, such as
minimum wages and/or employment protection legislations (DiPrete, 2005). In liberal, marketoriented regimes, such as the UK, there is less regulation and less cushion than in other developed
democracies (Stiglitz, 2012). Different scholars argue that the more economic insecurity and
inequality rise, the more negative sentiments against immigration will develop among locals,
addressing immigration as the source of that insecurity and that inequality (Wuthnow, 2002;
Uslaner & Brown, 2005; Arneil, 2006; Vietti & Scribner, 2013).
In the recent years, because of the origin of the majority of migration flows towards Europe,
authors have focused on the situation of Muslim minorities in Europe and the challenges they face
in countries where, according to part of the population, being Muslim often means being somehow
related to organized terrorism. Fetzer & Soper (2005) examine why some European states are more
prone than others to recognize the rights of Muslims to be integrated into the local society.
According to Modood (2005), who has examined the situation of Muslims in Britain and the rest
of Europe, Muslims’ integration is the most complicated to achieve and they are the ones to suffer
the most from isolation and inequality. Muslims are generally perceived the same way in Italy.
Prior research has analyzed the effects through which income inequality leads to a deterioration of
a country’s social capital. One is social-psychological: greater inequality negatively affects the
sense of solidarity and understanding of others’ needs (Delhey & Newton, 2005), and may also
diminish optimism towards the future and a sense of control over one’s life. The second effect
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involves the concept of economic scarcity: a diffused lack of wealth leads people to attack ethnic
groups that are perceived as a potential threat by locals who consider them responsible of the
worsening of their living conditions (Citrin et al., 1997). A role is also played by the lack of
experience with racial minorities in homogenous communities (Rabrenovic, 2007) and politicians
who misrepresent hunger and war in poor countries, suggesting that immigrants use those
phenomena as excuses to come to Europe, without any specific needs. Because of this perception,
locals try to avoid coexistence with immigrants and move to “protected” areas, with low or no
presence of immigrants (Mpanya, 1995; Rabrenovic, 2007). In host societies, immigration is
considered a major issue, when locals associate foreigners as disruptive for their wellbeing; such
perception may bring to the exclusion of immigrants from local societies (Margarit Segura &
Abde, 2014).
The hostility of locals towards immigrants may increase tension in certain situations, for example
when economies are already fragile, or when countries are facing periods of crisis; in this case,
locals feel threatened by the presence of immigrants and try to reduce contact as much as possible
(Brown et al., 2018).
Ha (2010) explains that “threat theory suggests that racial heterogeneity heightens racial tension:
the larger the proportion of the racial minority group, the greater is the perceived competition
among racial groups for jobs and other economic resources.”
The diffidence of locals towards immigrants and their role into local economies may result in
ethnic segregation, deriving from the desire of locals to abandon areas with immigrants and move,
when possible, to areas with more locals. Epstein and Semyonov (1992) show, with respect to
Jews and Palestinians in Israel, that the ethnic and spatial segregation across cities and regions,
due to issues of coexistence between the two populations, exacerbates and reinforces inequality in

33

the country. More specifically, the spatial segregation generates within-location Socio Economic
Status inequality (due to the similar social and economic characteristics of Palestinians living
together in certain areas and of Jews living together in others) and between-location Socio
Economic Status inequality (given by the differences between the areas where Jews and
Palestinians live) (Epstein & Semyonov, 1992). For example, levels of inequality are relatively
low in Jerusalem and the West Bank, but they are very high when we compare Jerusalem to the
West Bank. The same doubts towards immigration, and the same patterns of inequality, can be
observed among locals in several Western-European countries that, in the last decades, have
experienced rising numbers of immigrants and changes in the structure of their labor markets
(Musterd, 2016).
Countries like Italy and Spain have moved from being origin of migration to become destination,
particularly from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe (Calavita, 2006). In the last decades, Italy has
been one of the main destinations for immigrants coming mainly from Eastern Europe and the
MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, for geographical and economic reasons. Immigrant
flows have been possible mainly thanks to the so-called Mediterranean route (Mussida & Parisi,
2018). Italy hosted and currently hosts immigrants from a variety of countries, from Northern
Africa and Greece, but also from China, Iran, Philippines and Ethiopia. In the early 1990s, after
the disgregation of the Sovietic Union, many people started to leave Eastern Europe and the
Balkans to move west, mainly to Italy and Spain. The continuous growth of international migration
flows since the 2000s allowed migrants to become an important component of the Italian
population. In 2011, foreign residents in Italy represented more than 7% of the Italian population
(ISTAT Census Data, 2011). These numbers show how immigrants could potentially constitute an
important source of population growth and an added value for the overall productivity of the
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society. Despite that, they are often addressed by part of the population and politics as they main
cause of high inequality and poverty in the country (D’Agostino et al. 2016).
Table 1 shows which immigrant groups (defined according to their country of origin) prevail in
Italy, as of 2020 (data collected from the Italian Institute of Statistics) and their distribution in the
four Italian Macro-Regions (percentage values). I acknowledge that these data might only partially
describe the real number of immigrants present in the country, due to the lack of information on
illegal immigration, which is not collected by the official statistical sources.
Table 1 here
Calavita analyzes immigrant integration and the impact of laws and labor market segmentation in
Italy and Spain. She finds that the labor vacancies filled by immigrants, along with laws that often
do not incentivize legal integration, contribute to their exclusion despite a few attempts at the local
level to integrate them. Calavita (2006) claims that despite the efforts of part of the political
spectrum and nongovernmental organizations to integrate immigrants, their status is also
influenced by their position in the work force. Low-skilled and illegal immigrants tend to work in
jobs that natives are unwilling to do and generates dissatisfaction among locals who accuse
immigrants to steal their jobs; however, these jobs generally often low wages and are potentially
dangerous (McAreavey & Argent, 2018). A good example is the meat industry in the United States
that today employs mostly immigrants from Latin America and that has reshaped the labor and
social structure of regions like the Midwest, once populated mostly by Anglo-Saxon and
Scandinavian-origin communities. This change in structure was favored by the opportunity for
employers to recruit low-skilled, non-union workers and generate higher profits (Benson, 1999;
Fennelly & Leitner, 2002).
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This kind of employment keeps immigrants in a precarious situation, discourages integration and
keeps immigrants (even the ones with higher educations) from becoming socially and
economically relevant in the host country, thus representing a challenge more and more
complicated to overcome. (Calavita, 2006; Fullin and Reyneri 2011; Mussida & Parisi, 2016).
The purpose of the paper is to assess effect of presence of immigrants on inequality within and
between Italian regions. Faini (2009) posits that low-skilled immigrants who are less skilled ans
qualified (and normally come from developing countries) suffer from the lack of socio-economic
inclusion. Thus, their presence in host countries favors income inequality and isolation. On the
other hand, immigrants who are integrated in the host country and are given the chance to improve
their socio-economic condition, can climb the social ladder and reduce the gap with locals
(Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp, 2009; Codura Mart`ınez et al., 2013). When that happens, there is
less isolation, more integration and, therefore, less inequality. Indeed, the uneven economic
development of Italian regions influences the distribution and the “quality” of immigration
(Einaudi, 2007).
However, the lack of integration is not exclusively due to the attitude of locals. It may also depend
on the choices of immigrants; in fact, it is not uncommon for foreigners to choose to move to areas
where there is already a high presence of immigrants (preferably from the same regions) and lower
presence of locals, in order to reduce the trauma of moving to a different country (Ethnic Enclave
Hypothesis) (Portes and Jensen,1987; Edin et al., 2000; Light and Gold, 2000). This hypothesis
may be successfully applied at the regional level in Italy, where there seem to be stark differences
between the North and the South of the country, in terms of integration and career possibilities for
immigrants (Bettio et al., 2006; Reyneri, 2004; Venturini, 2017).
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Income disparities are also due to the lack of opportunities for immigrants. Mussida and Parisi
(2018) show that immigrants suffer from inequality of opportunity in the labor market when their
educational attainment is compared to that of nationals. This mismatch implies a difference
between the potential skills of immigrants and the jobs they are able to obtain in Italy, compared
to locals. One of the most important tools that host countries can use to favor integration is an
effective education system that helps and supports the integration of the children of immigrants.
Thanks to its geographical and administrative structure, the case of Italy can help explain the effect
of the presence of legal immigrants on income inequality at the regional level. The stark differences
between the North and the South of the country constitute a clear example of economic, social,
and demographic inequality and on how different regions deal with the integration of immigrants.
The analysis of the effect of immigration on income inequality is relevant for current theoretical
frameworks that have not considered such phenomenon at the regional level in Italy.
In conclusion, the goal of the study is to analyze how the presence of legal immigrants across the
twenty regions of Italy, together with other economic and demographic factors, can impact income
inequality in the country. The final purpose is to suggest policies that could favor the integration
of as many immigrants as possible, together with policies to eventually increase the level of social
Welfare and therefore stimulate wealth redistribution across the whole country.
Data and Estimation Methodology
Data and Methodology
In order to understand the drivers behind internal mobility in Italy this paper employs a detailed
set of migration data within an empirical framework that considers economic and social factors,
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such as unemployment, education, and population. Data for this paper were gathered from the
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), and from the European Institute of Statistics (Eurostat)
which contain important information on the variables of interest in Italy at the regional level
(NUTS 2).
The main purpose is to use the data to analyze the effect of the presence of foreign residents on
inequality, at the regional level in Italy. Foreign residents are intended as people who were born
abroad and came to Italy to work and live.
One important reason behind the choice to analyze legal immigrants lies behind data availability;
at the regional level, foreign born residents are much easier to detect, compared to yearly entrances,
especially when immigrants who enter the country are undocumented. Currently, there are no
official regional data available, regarding yearly entrances of illegal immigrants in Italy. On the
contrary, censuses and local population registers often provide detailed information about foreign
residents in every region. Thanks to this approach, it is possible to try to assess questions more
suited to highly detailed and large national datasets, thus facilitating the analysis of the population
structure, in terms of, among others, education, unemployment, and income level, and the temporal
and spatial distribution of foreign-born residents.
Figure 1 below represents the quantity of foreign-born residents in the twenty Italian regions, in
the years considered by this analysis (2007-2016). As the graph shows, in several there is a
negative peak in the quantity of migration flows in year 2011, in those regions that are typically
characterized by high quantities of foreign residents; this decrease in foreign residents is
considered as a result of the delayed manifestation and long-lasting effects of the financial crisis
(Di Quirico, 2010; de Belvis et al., 2012).
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Figure 1 here

The figure also highlights how the regions of the North host, on average, a much higher number
of foreign residents, compared to the Center and South of Italy. Such regions are more attractive,
in terms of quality of life, better job offer, higher wages and more efficient health and social
systems (Rapporto SVIMEZ, 2019).

Figure 2 here

Figures 2 represents the evolution of inequality in the country through the decade 2007-2016,
according to the index of within-region inequality used in this paper: the Gini Index. What emerges
is the confirmation of a global trend that saw the rise of inequality in the years following the
financial crisis of 2007-2008, even in developed countries and regions (Assouad, Chancel, and
Morgan, 2018).

The Model
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the effect of immigration from abroad and the others
demographic controls on both within- and between-region inequality, in order to understand what
happens in the nation but also within each region. Three proxies of inequality have been chosen
for the analysis. Two measures of within-region inequality and one measure for between-regions
inequality. The two proxies for within-region inequality used here are the Gini Index and the
S60/S20 ratio. The proxy to measure between-region inequality is an index of Standardized GDP
per Capita (calculated through the mean and standard deviation of the GDP per capita of every
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region) to measure between-region inequality. The table below provides a brief description of both
variables.

Table 2 here

In this paper I used weighted seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to test the following
hypotheses:

H1: the presence of foreign immigrants does not have a significant effect on within-region
inequality;
H2: the presence of foreign immigrants does not have a significant effect on between-regions
inequality;
H3: the ethnic segregation caused by the transfer of locals to regions with no immigrants generates
within-location SES equality and between-location SES inequality.

As mentioned in Section 1 of the paper, the choice of using a Seemingly Unrelated approach lies
behind the potential issues of endogeneity between the two main independent variables of the
model (lagged inequality and immigrants per capita) and the dependent variable (inequality).
Furthermore, given that between- and within-inequality tend to be correlated, and that they could
be considered the components of an overall index of inequality, SUR allows to simultaneously
estimate—using inequality-specific explanatory equations—the different independent effects of
the variables of interest on each of the inequality measures used in this paper. SUR allows to
estimate coefficients for unemployment, education, immigrants, and population, and their
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interactions while exploiting the correlation between the inequality cross-equation disturbances
(Zellner, 1962; Anwaar et al., 2012).
The classical SUR is expressed by a system of linear regressions:

Within-Inequality (Gini Index) =β0 + β1′xit-1 + eit (1)
Within-Inequality (S60/S20) = γ0 + γ 1′wit-1 + eit (2)
Between-Inequality = a0 + a1′z it-1 + eit (3)

Xit-1 = [Gini it-1, Immigrants it-1, Unemploymentit-1, Populationit-1, Educationit-1]
Wit-1 = [S60/S20 it-1, Immigrants it-1, Unemploymentit-1, Populationit-1, Educationit-1]
Zit-1 = [Standardized GDP it-1, Standardized Immigrants it-1, Standardized Unemploymentit-1,
Standardized Populationit-1, Standardized Educationit-1]
The explanatory variables included in the first two models are within- variables, describing
parameters for each of the twenty Italian regions. The explanatory variables included in the third
model are standardized in order to describe what happens among the twenty Italian regions.

All the equations are dynamic, due to the medium-to-long term effect on income inequality
expected in variables like pre-existing inequality, immigration and unemployment. To provide
more robustness to the models and to verify long-term effects all the original models have been
run using two- and three-years lags. In both cases of within- and between-regions inequality, an
important trigger for income inequality is represented by unemployment rate. I expect very high
levels of unemployment to reduce income inequality and to provide a good proxy for the quality
of social Welfare at the regional level. The unemployment rate, in this case, also represents a good
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measure of different employment opportunities in different regions (Biagi et al., 2011). Following
the same logic, another one of the explanatory variables used in this model (Education) has a
double purpose. First of all, it is important as it represent a proxy of human capital in the
population, but also as a variable that describe the perception that people have of immigrants,
assuming that the higher the level of education, the more people should be aware of the positive
effects that the successful integration of immigrants could have on the whole system in the host
country. This variable is important, as it is arguable that the higher widespread levels of education
could help shrinking inequality (Biagi et al., 2011).
An important demographic variable included in this model is represented by the total population
in each region, given that higher differentials in population stimulate higher levels of inequality
and that the two indexes of within-region inequality are sensitive to structural changes at the
middle of the income distribution (Etzo, 2011).
The analysis takes into consideration the years 2007-2016. While acknowledging the importance
of analyzing longer periods, the choice was driven by the lack of data available before 2007, at the
regional level, provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics.

Results
The empirical analysis in the paper was carried through a seemingly unrelated approach (SUR).
The outcome of the analysis seems to confirm the initial hypothesis and shows that the presence
of immigrants in Italian Regions does not constitute a significant factor for the increase of income
inequality; this is true for both within-region inequality and between-region inequality. The next
paragraphs will provide detailed summaries of the results for all the models analyzed in the paper.
To provide more robustness to the analysis, I have also run the same model with two-years and
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three-years lags; these robustness checks have been performed in order to assess the effect of the
predictors on income inequality in the longer term and confirm the results obtained in the original
model. The next paragraphs describe in detail the results of the different models of within- and
between-regions inequality, in the short and long term. All the tables reporting the results of the
analysis and can be found in the Appendix.

Within-Region Inequality (Tables 3-8)
In the case of the Gini index (Tables 3-5), high levels of inequality at the origin are associated with
pre-existing levels of inequality. The model establishes higher levels of education at the origin as
a significant trigger for within-region inequality; this result suggests that regions with higher levels
of education suffer from higher inequality, due the polarization of the society and the wider income
gap between those who have a university degree and those who do not. These results corroborate
Bourdieu’s theory (1993) of higher education as a powerful contributor to the maintenance and
reproduction of social inequality. As expected, and in accordance with literature (Etzo, 2008,
2011), another significant factor is constituted by pre-existing high levels of unemployment at the
regional level that appear to stimulate the rise of inequality. As hypothesized at the beginning of
the paper, there seems to be no connection between the presence of foreign residents and withinregion inequality, suggesting that forbidding the entrance of immigrants in the country would not
solve the problem of regional income inequality in the long term. The same results can be observed
when the measure used for within-region inequality is the S60/S20 ratio (Tables 6-8). This ratio
was used to provide an alternative for the Gini Index; the Gini Index was initially chosen given its
sensitivity to changes in the middle of the income distribution (those people who usually oppose
the presence of immigrants in their homeland); however, the index has been labeled as a measure
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that does not account for structural changes in a population. The S60/S20 ratio provides a valid
alternative to the Gini Index that still accounts for the population in the middle of the income
distribution, while directly comparing it to the bottom quintile of the income distribution. The
results obtained using the S60/S20 confirm the results obtained when using the Gini Index. The
presence of immigrants in Italian does not affect the levels of income inequality. On the contrary,
triggers of income inequality are represented by pre-existing levels of inequality and the
polarization of levels of education.

Table 3 here
Table 4 here
Table 5 here
Table 6 here
Table 7 here
Table 8 here

Between-Region Inequality (Tables 9-14)
The between-regions inequality model suggests, in accordance with the within-region model that
pre-existing inequality stimulates higher inequality today and that pre-existing higher levels of
education stimulate inequality as well. Furthermore, in this model, like in the previous one, the
presence of foreign immigrants seems to have no effect whatsoever in the rise of inequality
between regions, suggesting that the existing gap between the North and of the South of the country
is not triggered by the difference presence of foreigners. What is different from the previous model
is that population and unemployment are negatively correlated to between-regions income
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inequality; this implies that a uniform distribution of the population across the country and similar
levels of unemployment have a shrinking effect on long-term inequality. The between-regions
model also employs the use of internal mobility of locals throughout the twenty Italian regions.
This measure was obtained calculating the regional Net Migration Rate for each Italian region.
This index, describing internal mobility of locals, has proven to be positively correlated with
between-regions inequality, corroborating the third hypothesis of this paper, proving that the ethnic
segregation caused by the transfer of locals to regions with no immigrants generates within-high
between-regions SES inequality.

Table 9 here
Table 10 here
Table 11 here
Table 12 here
Table 13 here
Table 14 here

Mixed Models (Tables 15-20)
The two mixed models of income inequality analyzed in this paper, where the reciprocal effect of
within- and between-region inequality is taken into consideration provide the expected results. The
two different inequalities negatively affect each other, suggesting, as hypothesized, that the ethnic
segregation due to the transfer of locals who do not want to live alongside foreigners generates
within-location SES equality and between-location SES inequality in the long term. It also
suggests that, before locals decide to transfer to regions with smaller or no presence of foreigners,
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within-region inequality is higher, while between-region inequality is smaller. As in the previous
models, also the mixed models that verify the effects of within- and between-regions inequality on
each other are consistent through years, highlighting that the hypotheses stated at the beginning
are corroborated in the short term, as well as in the long term.

Table 15 here
Table 16 here
Table 17 here
Table 18 here
Table 19 here
Table 20 here

In general, the different models analyzed in this paper suggest that income inequality within and
between regions is affected in the short term and in the long term by different levels of
unemployment, population, education, and pre-existing inequality. What emerges from the
obtained results is that the presence of foreigners does not have any significant impact on income
inequality in Italy and at the regional level in the short and long term, suggesting that restrictive
policies that limit the number of immigrants in the country do not have any positive effects.

Conclusions
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effect of the presence of immigrants, together with
economic, social, and demographic factors on inequality at the regional level in Italy. The three
hypotheses stated that immigrants do not have a significant effect on inequality within and between
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regions; furthermore, it was hypothesized that in the long term, the transfer of residence of locals,
from regions with more immigrants to regions with little or no immigrants, would have reduced
within-region inequality and increased between-regions inequality. This analysis constitutes a first
and explorative attempt to consider the role of immigrants as an important driver for assessing
interregional inequality in Italy on multiple levels at the same time (within and between). The
results provide some interesting insights for future research. The lack of effect that the presence of
immigrants has on regional inequality suggest that the perception of the damages on the Italian
economy and society brought by foreigners are not realistic and that such effects are to be found
in other factors, such as pre-existing inequality, unemployment, and education, among others. This
means that wealth redistribution policies can shape the social and economic setup of the different
regions of a country and exacerbate, or shrink existing levels of inequality (Zhang et al., 2019).
To this respect, for future analysis, it would be interesting to analyze inequality from a different
point of view, taking into consideration different levels of income and the effect that the presence
of immigrants has on them. Unemployment provides interesting information about regional
inequality. When unemployment levels are high within regions, the effect on inequality is positive;
on the contrary, between regions, the effect is significantly negative, suggesting that similar levels
of unemployment across regions tend to shrink differences among them. This support what posited
by Oishi et al. (2018) according to whom areas with higher levels of unemployment are
characterized by lower average incomes, alongside lower inequality. Education has shown to be
also an important factor, which a positive effect on both inequalities (within- and between-region)
in the long term. This result suggests that levels of inequality could be lowered through important
investments in education in Italy, to give everyone the opportunity to study, irrespectively from
their income level and geographical origin.

47

Together with investments in education, it would probably be beneficial if the government realized
investments to favor jobs offering in the south of the country; this is suggested by the negative
effect that population has on between-regions inequality, meaning that when the population is
equitably redistributed across regions, in the long-term interregional inequality shrinks.
The results of the paper also confirm the third hypothesis posited at the beginning of the paper: the
residence transfer of locals following the coexistence with immigrants generates ethnic
segregation, as it leads to within-region SES equality and between-region SES inequality. The
result suggests that as foreigners arrive to a region, they might initially increase within-region
inequality, because they generally have lower SES, but with no effect on the long term; however,
they may push locals to move to another location, thus decreasing within-region inequality (as
only foreigners of similar SES stay and locals of higher SES leave) but increasing between-region
inequality (as locals of higher SES arrive to places with fewer foreigners). In other words, the
resulting within- and between-region ethnic homogeneity (because between-region ethnichomogeneity increases with locals changing residence and decreases with foreigners changing
residence) generates within-region equality and between-region inequality.
This paper analyzed a complicated and challenging moment for the global and the Italian
economies: the years after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. All the results obtained in this paper
could be influenced by the uniqueness of the situation. For future research, it would be convenient
to gather data at the regional level for the years before the crisis, when available. The analysis of
interregional inequality trends through decades would help better isolate the effect of the financial
crisis and provide more information on the drivers of interregional inequality in expansionary and
recessionary periods. The paper highlights the important social and political consequences of
inequality within and between regions and its perception. The results obtained suggest the need of
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important investments (in education, health and legalization of immigrants) in areas where
inequality and unemployment are high, in order to increase wealth and population redistribution,
reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and create better living conditions in those regions
that are still suffering the consequences of the Great Recession. The reduction of vertical and
horizontal inequality would allow more uniform levels of development across the country.
To my knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to analyze, through a seemingly unrelated
approach, models of within- and between-regions inequality in Italy; it would be instructive to
analyze whether similar patterns can be identified in different contexts such as, for instance, other
European countries.

Chapter 3
Black Swans and Inequality: How Unpredictable Events Shape Internal Migration and
Income Inequality in Italy

Key words
Abruzzo, building damage, earthquake, income, Italy, migrations

Abstract
Italy is a country that has historically been prone to suffer from natural disasters, like earthquakes. The
main goal of the paper is to verify a causal relation between exogenous shocks and mobility at the regional
level in Italy. Using data on internal migrations from the region of Abruzzo (historically prone to
earthquakes), the paper analyzes the effects of natural disasters on migrations, at the subnational level, in
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both origin and destination regions, after the shock. The paper studies the major earthquake that hit several
towns in Abruzzo in April 2009. While research extensively addresses the effects on natural disasters on
the environment and on the economy of countries suffering from them, there is very little research on the
effects of internal migration due to exogenous causes in Italy. What this paper adds to the existing literature
is the causal relation between shocks and internal mobility. The use of an exogenous variable, like a natural
shock, helps avoiding the problem of endogeneity between dependent and independent variables, often
found in literature. Further novelty is brought by the fact that the analysis has been realized at the municipal
level. The results obtained in the paper show that in the short-term intermediate levels of earthquake
intensity disincentive mobility, while high levels of intensity nudge it. However, the situation changes in
the medium-to-long term. Once the causal relation between the earthquake and migrations is established, I
offer different policy implications.

Introduction
There is widespread debate over the effects of natural disasters on migrations. Residents living in
the most vulnerable areas are the ones affected the most by sudden shocks, due to their reliance
upon agriculture and manufacture sectors and a broader inability for many poorer households to
cope with the consequences of events like earthquakes, or floods (Zhang et al., 2015). Migration
therefore represents a feasible solution and a realistic strategy through which households may react
to sudden and disruptive changes in their lives. The study of natural shocks is important for their
direct effect on the environment, on public buildings, and on private houses. Natural disasters also
have medium-to-long term economic and social effects, especially if governments are not able to
deal efficiently with the aftermath of a shock and help the affected communities to recover. The
negative externalities and consequences of such events could potentially generate more turmoil
and human losses if not faced properly (Rodriguez-Oreggia et al., 2013).
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Disasters vary greatly, both in frequency of occurrence as in damage intensity; the most frequent
disasters are floods and storms, while the most damaging events are represented by earthquakes
(Yamamura, 2014). Disasters like these have a direct impact on human mobility and as well as
direct and indirect effects on inequality.
This paper analyzes the devastating effects that the April 2009 earthquake had on the Italian region
of Abruzzo and how it affected the migration of residents from Abruzzo to the rest of Italy. More
than three hundred people lost their lives in the event and about 1500 were injured (Volpini, 2009).
Sixty thousand buildings were seriously damaged, including the main hospital and trauma center
of the region. In total, 67500 people were left homeless and/or unemployed (Casarotti et al., 2009).
These numbers are impressive but not completely unexpected, given that the region of Abruzzo is
located in a historically seismic area. Abruzzo and its capital, L’Aquila, have a millennial history
and a very substantial concentration of historic buildings in its center, most of which were
completely destroyed. Besides the 14 outlying villages of L’Aquila municipality, another 15 towns
registered severe effects and 31 were moderately damaged. Among the worst affected villages,
Onna, Paganica, San Gregorio, Tempéra, and Villa Sant’Angelo had their historical centers closed
to the public and presided over by the police or fire services. The first of these, Onna, a historic
village of 300 residents substantially disappeared in its entirety and registered a total of 40 victims
(Levy & Chennat, 2010).
The L’Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009 was a classic example of a medium-power seismic event.
However, given the high vulnerability of building stock in the mountains of Abruzzo, it had a
disproportionately large human impact. This earthquake represents a good example of how
moderate events are more common than the larger events, and, in countries or regions that are not
prepared, can cause disproportionate suffering (Alexander, 2010). To this respect, the months and
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years immediately after the earthquake were characterized by strong debates all over the country
about whether the event could have been foreseen and its effects somehow limited.
Previous literature has thoroughly discussed the earthquake and its effects (e.g. Calvi, 2009;
Papanikolaou et al., 2009; Rossetto et al., 2009); however, there has been no analysis so far on the
effects the earthquake had on people’s lives and migrations in the short and long term.
The aim of this paper is to study and analyze the effects of the earthquake, together with other
relevant demographic factors (i.e. average income per capita, presence of immigrants, and number
of residents), to verify how the earthquake of Abruzzo affected internal mobility at the subnational
level in Italy in 2009 and in the following years, until 2016. The results from the proposed models
emphasize that very high levels of building damages are the ones that force people to migrate to
other regions in the short term. On the contrary, medium and medium-to-high building damages
do not stimulate migrations from the home region. However, the results change in the long term.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 illustrates the contribution provided by existing literature
on the effects of natural disasters on people’s mobility. Section 3 provides detailed information on
the research objective of this paper and the data and methodologies used to perform the analysis.
Section 4 highlights the main results obtained in the paper. Section 5 provides conclusions and
policy suggestions.

Theoretical Support
Literature has previously discussed how the effects of natural disasters vary according to
geographical areas and socioeconomic status; wealthy people usually reside in areas that are more
protected and less prone to natural shocks, while poor people rarely have the chance to choose
where to live. Due to budget constraints, poor people are believed to be more exposed to disasters
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and less engaged in disasters-prevention investments. (Rodriguez-Oreggia, De La Fuente, De La
Torre, & Moreno, 2013).
With respect to migrations as a reaction to natural disasters, Petersen (1958, 1978) argued that
several macro-level factors should be taken into account in the elaboration of theories of migration
to recognize the importance of social and economic factors that encourage people to migrate. Hugo
(2008) adds to Petersen the relationship between people migrations and the environment, in the
short and long term, differentiating between voluntary and forced migration; in the case of
disasters, such as earthquake and hurricanes, for instance, migration is more likely to be forced at
the beginning. However, migration may become voluntary in the longer term, due to economic
opportunities or constraints. The same way, preferences towards migration may change over time
and people could decide to migrate months, or years after the disaster or even decide to come back
to the affected areas, for economic or personal reasons. Morrow-Jones and Morrow-Jones (1991)
highlights how lower and medium classes are more likely to change preferences towards migration
over time, due to their higher dependency on the economic and social situation of the areas and
sectors affected by the disaster.
Social vulnerability is considered one of the most important factors behind people’s migrations
after disasters, both in the short and long term. Economically weak communities are in fact more
vulnerable to the effects of natural disaster and literature has widely recognized them as the ones
more susceptible to migration in the wake of events like the ones described here (Hunter, 2005).
As the poor suffer the most, the correlation between low socio-economic development and the
impacts of natural disasters is widely recognized (Schumacher & Strobl, 2011; Kim, 2012). The
effect of natural disaster is in multiple cases shaped and enhanced by the level of economic and
human development of the communities that suffer from it. The level of development is a critical
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factor and disasters have a different effect, according to the ability of region and communities to
deal with it (Battistella, G., 2002).
Another important factor nudging migrations after natural disasters is the damage suffered by
private and public buildings. For instance, research regarding the United States, and particularly
Florida, shows that lower socioeconomic status households are more likely to live in housing units
that are inadequately equipped to resist to natural disasters like storms, earthquakes, and floods,
compared to housing units where people with high socioeconomic status reside (Peacock & Girard,
1997). Research also highlighted how people belonging to lower social classes are more likely to
be renters, mobile home occupants and reside in lower-quality buildings, therefore being
significantly threatened by environmental hazards (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; Tierney et al., 2006).
People’s and buildings’ density also play an important role in the voluntary or forced post-disasters
migrations. In areas where density is higher, such as the region of Abruzzo analyzed in the paper,
there are more chances of mass displacement as a consequence of an environmental shock. Thus,
it would not be surprising to observe high numbers of individuals migrating from affected areas in
the short and long term.
Serious disasters, like the Italian earthquake that hit Abruzzo in 2009, destroying entire towns,
have such disruptive effects that they hinder the future development of the affected communities.
If massive and/or recurrent, such events may even undermine the overall economic and social
development and have significant effects on voluntary and forced displacements, in absence of
adequate recovery policies implemented by local and national governments (Kim, 2012).
When a disaster occurs in a developing country, or, in this case, a less developed region, which
lacks the economic resources to meet the needs of its vulnerable citizens, the people affected by it
might find necessary to migrate somewhere else, to look for better opportunities (Afsar, 2004).
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The lack of opportunities may foster migration but only for those people who have the means and
the chance to move (i.e. presence of social networks, like family or friends and liquidity). Those
who lack those means may be forced to keep living in the areas hit by the shock (or close by),
limiting their chances of recovery (Boldrin, & Canova, 2000).
Chances of out-migration may increase if affected areas become economically and socially
moribund in the aftermath of the event. However, such areas can also draw in immigrants
(normally from developing countries), via different sources, such as 1) relatives and organizations
coming in to provide support and 2) new migrants arriving in search of work in the reconstruction
effort. These factors affect the chances of recovery and levels of inequality in the regions hit by
the shock. This last aspect has often generated debate in Italy (and in the rest of Europe) between
those who perceive immigrants as useful resource, especially in dramatic situations, and those who
perceive them as an unnecessary burden (Margarit Segura & Abde, 2014).
Internal migration experienced important trends in Italy, during the past century. This migration
was mainly directed from the South to the North and was usually moved by economic factors, like
unemployment and wage levels. Migration was triggered in the 1950s and 1960s by the so-called
Economic Boom, which provoked an increase in labor demand from the most important Italian
industries, mostly located in the North of the country. The trend lasted for at least 20 years, nudged
also by family and friends’ networks, which dragged numerous people from the Southern regions
to the Northern ones. Specifically, the so-called Industrial Triangle (Genoa-Turin-Milan) was the
area that attracted the highest number of immigrants from the south of Italy.
However, this migration was due to economic reasons. Environmental migration is different and
is triggered by shocks like earthquakes, floods, or tsunamis, among others. This kind of migration
involves the whole world and Italy represents no exception. The two violent earthquakes that hit
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the country in 2009 (Abruzzo) and 2012 (Emilia-Romagna) are considered the most expensive
natural disaster of all times in Europe. Entire houses, business, public buildings, and even towns
have been destroyed, causing damages for $16 billion and forcing many people to run away. In
2013, 32.4 million people were forced to abandon their homes in the whole world, as a
consequence of natural disasters (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015). Natural
shocks, just like economic shocks, hit more often, and with more destructive effects, those areas
where the quality of life and infrastructure is worse and where citizens have no way to protect
themselves. In 2012 in Europe around 75.000 people were forced to leave their houses, as a
consequence of natural disasters (and the Italian earthquakes represent a big chunk of it) (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015). The specific statistic about Europe is relevant for this
paper because it helps understand how environmental shocks can affect entire socio-economic
systems and their effect is not limited to the destruction of private and public buildings. Long term
economic effects are important with respect of migrations from the affected areas: as mentioned
at the beginning people have more chances to migrate if they have enough liquidity to afford it
(Bayraktar, Y. 2017).
What makes these climatic or environmental migrations interesting is that vulnerable people often
do not have the means to protect themselves and anticipate the consequences of natural disasters,
or cope with effects. They tend to live in peripheral, densely populated neighborhoods, without
acceptable human and financial capital and suffer disproportionately from disasters like
earthquakes, tsunamis and floods. The increase of internal migrations for those who can afford it
may represent a challenge for social cohesion and enhance inequality, through socioeconomic
segregation (Faini et al., 1997). In fact, migrations from areas hits by disasters to different regions,
or provinces, especially if fast and sudden, may alter the socio-economic structure of a region and
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enhance the delta between rich and poor (Musterd, 2005). However, literature has shown that the
effect of disasters varies over time. As posited by Yabe et al. (2019), with respect to Japan, another
country historically prone to sudden disasters like earthquakes, migration patterns vary over time
and income levels, according to how authorities are successful in dealing with the effects of such
disasters.
According to previous literature, internal migration has a more effective role in decreasing
inequality in migrants-receiving regions, due to the fact that internal immigrants imply lower costs
and lower social risks, compared to international immigrants (De Haas, 2009). However, the
effects of internal migrations might differ, comparing short versus long term. Financial
possibilities also constitute a factor that influences internal migrations: despite the willingness of
individuals to migrate, only who has the necessary liquidity will be able to do so, while who lacks
liquidity might be forced to stay in the areas affected by a natural shock. However, recovery may
be favored by government policies which aim to redistribute wealth to the poor and due to the
presence of migration networks (family, friends, remittances), which can help poor families to
relocate and integrate in a different region than the one hit by environmental disasters (Bayraktar,
2017). In absence of those networks, individuals tend to migrate, assuming that the costs of
migration are relatively low.
Previous literature tends to define internal migration as a factor that reduces inequality because it
focuses on analyzing those cases when migrations are triggered by increasing supply of labor,
opposed to increasing demand of labor, together with lower wages in less wealthy regions. This
paper, on the contrary, analyzes sudden migrations triggered by unexpected natural disasters.
These migrations are not necessarily accompanied by availability of jobs and services for those
people who migrate; therefore, these people might increase the unemployment rate of the regions
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of destination and get isolated in suburbs, if they cannot afford leaving in more expensive, central
areas. As a result, inequality could increase. Furthermore, inequality could also increase in the
areas hit by disasters. Labor supply is likely to decrease if businesses and activities are penalized
by the occurrence of natural shocks. Jobs are lost, especially the labor-intensive ones, causing the
gap between rich and poor to widen. On the contrary, according to Vakulenko (2015), when
businesses survive the disaster, migrations might increase employment for non-migrating people,
therefore reducing inequality in the region of origin.

Research Objective and Methods
The purpose of this paper is to attest the effect of exogenous, natural shocks on internal mobility,
with focus on the earthquake that hit the center of Italy in 2009.

The central hypotheses of this paper are:

•

H1: Natural disasters increase rates of internal mobility from the region hit by the shock,
to the other regions of the country;

•

H2: The effects of building damages on mobility change with time, showing differences in
migration patterns between short and long term.

Data sources and Methodology
The main sources of this analysis are the Italian Institute of Statistics and the European Institute
of Statistics, which provide useful data on regional inequality for this analysis.
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The main purpose is to analyze the effect of the earthquake that hit central Italy in 2009 on internal
mobility to the rest of Italy. As a proxy for internal mobility, I am using the Net Migration Rate at
the municipal level. The net migration rate represents the difference between the number of
immigrants (people coming into an area) and the number of emigrants (people leaving an area)
throughout a given year. When the number of immigrants is larger than the number of emigrants,
a positive net migration rate occurs. A positive rate indicates that there are more people entering
than leaving an area. When the people who migrate from a region outnumber those who arrive to
the same region, the result is a negative net migration rate. When there is an equal number of
immigrants and emigrants, the net migration rate is balanced.

The net migration rate is calculated over a one-year period using the mid-year population and a
ratio (over 1000 inhabitants):

Net Migration Rate: N = (I - E) / M * 1000

N = Net Migration Rate

I = Number of Immigrants Entering the Area

E = Number of Emigrants Leaving the Area

M = Mid-Year Population
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In order to isolate the effect of the earthquake from the one of the economic crisis that hit the whole
world in 2007-2008 and that could have affected mobility rates, I use a proxy variable to measure
the damages of the earthquake. The proxy is the number of private and public buildings damaged
by the earthquake in each town in Abruzzo, according to four different levels of damage (A, B, C,
E). A represents the lowest level of damage, E the highest. To be sure that the effect of the
earthquake will be isolated, I use a panel data analysis, to check the evolution of level of damage
of buildings in the towns hit by the earthquake from 2009 to 2016.
Together with the proxy to measure the intensity of the disaster, I use demographic variables such
as average income per capita, presence of immigrants, average age of the population, and number
of residents. The data for the paper were obtained by the USRC (Special Office for the
Reconstruction of the Towns Destroyed by the Earthquake), the USRA (Special Office for the
Reconstruction of L’Aquila), the Italian Institute of Statistics and the different municipal
databases, and the local newspaper “Il Centro”.

The Model
The model aims to describe the effects of the 2009 earthquake and a series of demographic
variables on the Net Migration Rate at the municipal level in the towns hit by the disaster.

The following variables are included in the model:

Mi = Net Municipal Migration Rate: transfers to and from the analyzed town
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Ei = Intensity of Earthquake: measured in terms of damaged buildings in every town (very low to
very high)
Ri = Number of residents in each town
PGi = Net Population Growth for each town
AAi = Average Age of citizens for each town
AIi = Average Income of citizens for each town
Fi = Number of Foreign citizens for each town

The following is a simple OLS model that aims to establish a relationship between migration flows
in each of the analyzed towns and the intensity of the earthquakes, plus some socio-economicdemographic control variables (concerning years 2009-2016). The model follows below:

Mit = b0 + b1Eit + b2Xit + ei
Mit = b0 + b1Eit-1 + b2Xit-1 + ei
Mit = b0 + b1Eit-2 + b2Xit-2 + ei

In the OLS model above, the dependent variable describes the net migration flows from and to
each town. E describes the intensity of the earthquake, in terms of damaged buildings and X puts
together the socio-economic and demographic variables listed above. The subscript i represents
each town hit by the earthquake. In order to analyze the effects of the earthquake on internal
mobility in the medium-to-long term, the same model is replicated using one- and two-years lags.

Results

61

The graphs below represent the direction of the effect that different levels of building damage have
on out-migration from Abruzzo towards the rest of Italy, right after the earthquake and two years
later.

Figure 1 here
Figure 2 here

The results show a positive correlation between internal mobility and low and high building
damage. On the contrary, the effect of intermediate levels of damage on mobility is negative. A
plausible interpretation is that the people who left Abruzzo are only those who wanted to (and
could afford it), or the ones who could not avoid it, due to the intensity of the damage they had
suffered. Things, however, change over time and results show a positive effects of intermediate
levels of damage on mobility and a negative effect of low and high levels of building damage on
mobility.

The following tables show in detail the results of the analysis performed in the short and mediumto-long term.

Table 1 here
Table 2 here
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Table 3 here

The tables show how the two medium levels of damage (B and C) significantly disincentive
internal mobility at the municipal level in Abruzzo in the short term, while low and high levels of
building damage have the opposite effect. However, in the longer term the situation changes. When
a two-years lag is applied the effects of building damages go in the opposite direction, with respect
to the short term. In the long term, in fact, low and high levels of damage disincentive migrations
from the towns affected by the disaster, while intermediate levels of damage seem to nudge them.
This change, in line with what hypothesized earlier in the paper and posited by Yabe et al. (2019),
might mean that economics, social, and personal conditions change with time; in other words, if
governments are not able to prompt a speedy recovery from the aftermath of the earthquake, people
will not be able to move or might be forced to move, at some point, according to economic and
personal factors.
The results also highlight the significant effect that the number of residents in the town affected
by the earthquake have on mobility: the higher the number of residents, the more people migrate
from Abruzzo to the rest of the country in the short term. The result is consistent with Etzo (2008,
2011) and the claim that unfavorable socioeconomic conditions (like the ones resulting from the
earthquake) can stimulate mobility for those who can afford it. In the long term, however, things
change and higher numbers of residents in the towns affected by earthquake significantly reduce
migrations. The explanation could be twofold: on one side, it might be due to the fact that an
effective and speedy recovery in the region allows people to keep living in their town of origin.
On the other side, it might imply that the lack of efficient policies of recovery and redistribution
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of wealth might force people to stay in their town of origin, because they cannot afford moving to
other regions.
It is also worthy to mention the effect that the presence of foreign residents has on mobility: their
presence and involvement in the socioeconomic life of the towns affected by the disasters reduces
out-migrations from Abruzzo in the short and long term. This trend is useful policy-wise to identify
foreigners as an important resource for recovery in those areas of the country that are vulnerable
and in need of labor force.

Conclusions
The purpose of the study was to analyze the effect of the earthquake that hit the Italian region of
Abruzzo in 2009, together with economic, social, and demographic factors, on migrations from
the municipalities of Abruzzo to the rest Italy, in the years between 2009 and 2016. The two
hypotheses formulated at the beginning of the paper stated that 1) natural disasters increase rates
of internal mobility from the region hit by the shock, to the other regions of the country and that
2) the effects of building damages change with time, showing differences in migration patterns
between short and long term. The results obtained in the study provide interesting insights. The
analysis of the effects of the earthquake on internal mobility at the municipal level shows that
medium levels of damage significantly disincentivize migrations in the short and medium term
from the towns of Abruzzo hit by the earthquake of 2009. On the contrary, low and high levels of
damage have the opposite effect. However, confirming the second hypothesis of the paper, the
situation seems to change in the long term; after two years from the earthquakes, medium levels
of damage significantly nudge migrations from the town of Abruzzo, while low and high levels of
damage significantly disincentivize local mobility. This change in the scenario might be due to the
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fact that the needs and will of people, across towns and different levels of income varies over time
and follows the policies and measures put into practice by local and national governments to deal
with the aftermath of natural disasters (Yabe et al., 2019).
Together with the effects of the earthquake, the paper also discussed the relevance of several
demographic variables, such as the numbers of residents in the towns affected by the disasters, the
average income per capita, the presence of immigrants, and the average age of the residents. The
most interesting results are the ones concerning the number of residents in the towns affected by
the disaster and the presence of immigrants. With respect to the first variable, I have observed that
in the short term, a higher number of residents is positively and significantly correlated with higher
mobility, while in the longer term the effect is the opposite. The change in the result, similarly to
what happened with the different levels of damage, might be due to different of preferences over
time. At the beginning, right after the event, the higher the number of residents, the higher the
number of people affected by the disaster. As a consequence, there will be a smaller amount of
resources available to the community. However, over time, a higher presence of residents in the
region could describe two different scenarios: 1) on one side it might send a positive message to
the citizens, showing that the area is recovering and there is less necessity to move somewhere
else, therefore nudging people to stay; 2) people from the region, as a consequence of the disaster
and its long-term effects might lack the minimum resources to move somewhere else, being forced
to stay in the region and live in temporary housing units provided by the authorities. As shown by
Özerdem and Ruffini (2013) and as widely reported by Italian media over the years, given the
challenges that the Italian government faced to complete the reconstruction initiative taken right
after the disaster, the second option seems to be the more likely one, in the specific case of
Abruzzo.
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For what concern the negative effect of the presence of immigrants on mobility, the results show
that not only foreigners do not nudge people to migrate to other regions, but that their presence
significantly nudges people to stay. This means, in line with previous literature, that the presence
of immigrants is important in vulnerable areas facing periods of crisis and in need of recovery; this
is because immigrants often accept low-skilled labor that locals do not want to engage with and
that are essential to the economic life of the community and the recovery of vulnerable areas
(Benson, 1999; Fennelly & Leitner, 2002).
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the results obtain in the paper provide interesting
insights on the effects of the 2009 earthquake of Abruzzo and internal mobility from Abruzzo to
the rest of Italy. However, I acknowledge that the paper suffers from lack of important data and
needs further development. In this case, for instance, it would be interesting to check how the
effect of earthquakes on internal mobility change according to changes in average income, levels
of education, and unemployment. As of today, however, such data at the municipal level in
Abruzzo are not available.
Furthermore, when looking at the data analysis and methods, one might argue that years before
2009 should have been analyzed as well, in order to better isolate the effect of this exogeneous
shock on internal mobility and compare results before and after the earthquake. Unfortunately, this
was not possible as the local institutions that generously provided the data on building damages
made very clear that no data before 2009 are available; according to them, there was no reason to
check building damages and, in general, it was assumed that all the buildings had no damage
whatsoever. To make up for this issue, the model uses town fixes effects to capture the situation
before 2009.
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Another limit of the paper lies in the variable used to address the intensity of the earthquake:
building damage. The variable is divided into four categories: 1) A for low damage, 2) B for lowto-medium damage, 3) C for medium-to-high damage and 4) E for high damage. While providing
a general idea of the damage suffered by buildings in Abruzzo, as a consequence of the earthquake,
this categorical variable does not provide any measure of within-category variation, thus implying
that all the buildings included in each category suffered from the same amount of damage.
This generalization is unlikely to reflect the effective damage suffered from the buildings analyzed
in this paper and it would have been beneficial to have at disposal a continuous variable that could
detect within-category variations. However, to my knowledge, none of the institutions that
elaborated data on building damage in Abruzzo has reported any within-category variation.
The last purpose of the paper was to suggest policies that can help dealing with such phenomena,
both before and after they occur. When shocks happen, if poor people are the ones who suffer the
most the effects of the disaster, then the gap between rich and poor might widen (vertical
inequality). Furthermore, if the region hit by the earthquake, like in the case of Abruzzo in 2009,
is one of the less wealthy, compared for instance to developed regions like Lombardy and
Piedmont, then also the gap between rich and poor regions will widen, in the long term (horizontal
inequality) (Faini et al, 1997). If those who migrate are only the ones who can afford it and
governments are not able to put into practice efficient redistribution and recovery policies, then
the social composition of the region hit by the shock might be altered, due to socioeconomic
segregation, with consequent long lasting inequalities (Beegle et al., 2011; Munshi and
Rosenzweig, 2016).
Therefore, governments need to put into practice policies that favor prevention, where possible,
and, most of all, recovery after the shock. In Italy, after the events described in the paper, the
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government passed a bill that declares that all the buildings built in the country need to be antiseismic and imply tax breaks for those who restructure buildings that are not anti-seismic.
However, works are slow and, as of 2020, many people in Abruzzo are still housed in temporary
units, with no heating, nor air conditioning.
To implement other policies, in order to speed up works to rebuild those areas that have been
devastated and to help those who lost their house, or their job and cannot, or do not want to leave,
governments could institute centralized control organisms and finance them, in order to follow,
step by step, the implementation of such works.
In the case that horizontal and vertical inequalities emerge after such happenings, a strong
progressive taxation on financial wealth (beyond certain levels of income) could be beneficial, in
order to collect money to contribute to the reconstruction of the devastated areas and reduce
vertical and horizontal inequality (Piketty, 2011; Zucman, 2019). Last, the institution of a basic
income by the government to all the citizens, without means test or work requirement would be
helpful to reduce poverty and favor recovery at the individual level (Van Parjis, 2007).
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Appendix
First Chapter
Tables
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Figure 1 Migration Flows – Italian Regions

Figure 2 Inequality (Gini Index) – Italian Regions
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Figure 3 Inequality (Relative Poverty) – Italian Regions
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Figure 4 Inequality (Income Ratio) – Italian Regions
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Figure 5 Unemployment – Italian Regions

Table 1 List of Inequality Measures.
Variable

Description

Gini Index

Statistical measure of income distribution. The
coeﬃcient ranges from 0 (or 0%) to 1 (or 100%),
with 0 representing perfect equality and 1
representing perfect inequality.

Relative Poverty Index

Statistical measure describing economic struggle to
use goods and services in specific geographic areas,
in relation to the average economic level of the same
geographic areas.

Top 20% Income / Bottom 20% Income

Index describing the amount of people in the top
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20% of the income level scale in a specific
geographic area, compared to the amount of people
in the bottom 20% of the income level scale, in the
same geographic area.

Table 2 Instruments for Income Inequality.
Instrument

Description

Correlation

Correlation

Correlation

with Gini

with

with

Pov.

Rel.

Mean

Std.

Min.

Max.

Deviation

Income
Ratio

Theatre/Cinema

people

who

can

0.322

0.568

0.605

0.766

0.056

0.603

0.946

0.444

0.666

0.646

0.744

0.064

0.546

0.882

aﬀord
theatre/people who
can afford cinema.
Internet

people who make

Purchase/Internet

online

Access

purchases/people
with just internet
access.
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Table 3 IV Estimators
Estimator
LIML

Description
Linear combination of the OLS and 2SLS estimate (with the weights depending on the data). Absence
of the 2SLS bias. Very precise under homoskedasticity. Inconsistent under heteroskedasticity and
many instruments.

FULL

IV Estimator with lower bias than LIML, due to the smaller number of outliers. Very precise under
homoskedasticity. Inconsistent with heteroskedasticity and many instruments.

HLIM

Updated version of LIML, developed by Hausman, Newey, Woutersen, et al.(2008), consistent under
heteroskedasticity and many instrument robust versions.

HFUL

Updated version of FULL, developed by Hausman, Newey, Woutersen, et al.(2008), consistent under
heteroskedasticity and many instrument robust versions.

Table 4 Eﬀect of Inequality on Internal Mobility (OLS Model)
Independent Variables
Lagged Migration Flows
Lagged Gini Origin

Migration Flows
0.967***
(254.69)
380.27**

Migration Flows
0.967***
(257.09)

Migration Flows
0.968***
(257.80)

(2.08)
Lagged Gini Destination

705.3***
(2.09)

Lagged Relative Poverty Origin

0.752
(0.56)
-0.81
(0.53)

Lagged Relative Poverty Destination
Lagged Income Ratio Origin
Lagged Income Ratio Destination
Distance
Distance2
Lagged Unemployed Origin

-9.934*
(-1.48)
0.02*
(1.64)
-8.04***
(-3.08)
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-10.33*
(-1.59)
0.02*
(1.71)
-8.732***
(-3.51)

-37.62***
(3.76)
-3.921
(0.41)
-11.97**
(-2.21)
0.021**
(1.85)
-8.176***
(-3.15)

Lagged Unemployed Destination
Lagged Population Origin
Lagged Population Destination
Lagged Education Level Origin
Lagged Education Level Destination
Lagged Crime Origin
Lagged Crime Destination
Constant
Region Fixed Effects
Period Fixed Effects
R-squared
Observations
Number of regions

2.531
(116)
-0.000***
(-3.69)
-0.000***
(-2.76)
-14398.25**
(-1.99)
34315.0***
(3.55)
0.159
(0.15)
1.044
(0.88)
-1336.939
(-0.73)
Yes
Yes
0.023
3038
20

2.902
(1.20)
-0.001***
(-5.07)
-0.001***
(-2.92)
-17141.7**
(-2.29)
32680.12***
(3.26)
-0.038
(-0.04)
1.434
(1.26)
-905.01
(-0.49)
Yes
Yes
0.021
3038
20

1.145
(0.52)
-0.001***
(-5.30)
-0.001***
(-2.95)
-20908.52***
(-1.32)
33299.1***
(3.33)
0.256
(0.25)
0.323
(0.29)
-276.63
(-0.16)
Yes
Yes
0.021
3038
20

t statistics in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 5 Eﬀect of Inequality on Internal Mobility (2SLS Model)
Independent Variables
Lagged Migration Flows
Lagged Gini Origin
Lagged Gini Destination

Migration Flows
0.967***
(254.69)
10805.9***
(2.94)
166.5
(0.17)

Lagged Relative Poverty Origin

Migration Flows
0.967***
(257.09)

19.93***
(3.48)
-5.501
(1.45)

Lagged Relative Poverty Destination
Lagged Income Ratio Origin
Lagged Income Ratio Destination
Distance
Distance2
Lagged Unemployed Origin

Migration Flows
0.968***
(257.80)

-1.995***
(-12.41)
0.001***
(12.29)
-8.538
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-2.099***
(-13.60)
0.001***
(13.74)
0.105

-190.9***
(4.50)
107.6***
(4.08)
-2.132***
(-13.59)
0.001***
(13.77)
-12.76

Lagged Unemployed Destination
Lagged Population Origin
Lagged Population Destination
Lagged Education Level Origin
Lagged Education Level Destination
Lagged Crime Origin
Lagged Crime Destination
Constant
Region Fixed Effects
Period Fixed Effects
R-squared
Observations
Underidentification test
Chi-sq(2) P-val
Weak identification test
Sargan statistics
Chi-sq(1) P-val
Number of regions
t statistics in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

(-0.74)
-26.98***
(-5.15)
0.000***
(15.08)
0.000***
(34.31)
21016.1
(1.84)
61253.3***
(5.44)
14.47***
(4.25)
-4.000
(-1.24)
-3181.9***
(-3.73)
Yes
Yes
0.709
3038
140.258
0.000
72.850
0.517
0.419
20
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(0.01)
-21.46***
(-3.52)
0.000***
(29.76)
0.000***
(35.40)
28922.1**
(2.48)
56741.5***
(5.05)
19.92***
(5.99)
-5.005
(-1.62)
-571.0***
(-5.13)
Yes
Yes
0.726
3038
1284.983
0.000
1108.580
0.817
0.366
20

(-1.68)
-8.056
(-1.33)
0.000***
(29.08)
0.000***
(33.53)
-1478.939
(-0.14)
70417.2***
(6.29)
20.30***
(6.48)
-5.656*
(-1.82)
-277.4*
(-1.92)
Yes
Yes
0.722
3038
1097.769
0.000
808.171
0.162
0.687
20

Table 6 Eﬀect of Inequality on Internal Mobility (2SLS Model, with two time-lags)
Independent Variables
Two Lags Migration Flows
Two Lags Gini Origin
Two Lags Gini Destination

Migration Flows
0.967***
(254.7)
6108.8**

Migration Flows
0.967***
(257.1)

(2.16)
819.1
(0.86)

Two Lags Relative Poverty Origin

16.29***
(3.12)

Two Lags Relative Poverty
Destination

-8.123**
(-2.18)

Two Lags Income Ratio Origin

-2.048***
(-13.16)
0.001***
(12.97)
7.941
(0.87)
-31.28***
(-6.01)
0.000***
(19.85)
0.000***
(35.26)
12982.7
(1.24)

-2.112***
(-13.73)
0.001***
(13.73)
2.809
(0.37)
-18.63***
(-3.01)
0.000***
(28.71)
0.000***
(35.15)
19825.5*
(2.48)

-160.2***
(-4.09)
116.0***
(4.54)
-2.114***
(-13.53)
0.001***
(13.63)
-8.021
(-0.99)
-6.100
(-0.97)
0.000***
(28.30)
0.000***
(33.81)
-121.9
(-0.02)

52869.4***
(5.05)
16.71***
(5.05)
-5.948*
(-1.87)
-2137.4***
(-3.26)
Yes
Yes
0.721
3038
230.552
0.000
124.183
0.014
0.907

46846.7***
(4.43)
19.41***
(6.40)
-6.703**
(-1.62)
-471.0***
(-4.43)
Yes
Yes
0.727
3038
1450.932
0.000
1385.212
0.821
0.365

62232.9***
(5.86)
19.71***
(6.46)
-6.952**
(-1.82)
-308.7**
(-2.14)
Yes
Yes
0.724
3038
1201.297
0.000
990.623
0.063
0.805

Two Lags Income Ratio Destination
Distance
Distance2
Two Lags Unemployed Origin
Two Lags Unemployed Destination
Two Lags Population Origin
Two Lags Population Destination
Two Lags Education Level Origin
Two Lags Education Level
Destination
Two Lags Crime Origin
Two Lags Crime Destination
Constant
Region Fixed Effects
Period Fixed Effects
R-squared
Observations
Underidentification test
Chi-sq(2) P-val
Weak identification test
Sargan statistics
Chi-sq(1) P-val

Migration Flows
0.968***
(257.8)
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Number of regions
t statistics in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

20

20

20

Table 7 Eﬀect of Inequality on Internal Mobility (2SLS Model, with five time-lags)
Independent Variables
Five Lags Migration Flows
Five Lags Gini Origin
Five Lags Gini Destination

Migration Flows
0.967***
(254.7)

Migration Flows
0.967***
(257.1)

20469.2**
(2.13)
2103.4
(1.37)

Five Lags Relative Poverty Origin

18.85**
(2.30)

Five Lags Relative Poverty
Destination

-1.850
(-0.39)

Five Lags Income Ratio Origin

-1.872***
(-7.72)
0.001***
(7.71)
-61.35
(-1.52)
-52.57***
(-6.08)
0.000***
(7.99)
0.000***
(25.12)
18517.8
(1.39)

-2.134***
(-10.73)
0.001***
(10.81)
-6.199
(-0.44)
-39.13***
(-4.16)
0.000***
(19.33)
0.000***
(26.03)
24914.3*
(1.92)

-234.2***
(-2.64)
87.80**
(2.56)
-2.168***
(-10.76)
0.001***
(10.87)
-38.01
(-1.61)
-17.71*
(-1.66)
0.000***
(18.97)
0.000***
(26.31)
-3868.6
(-0.25)

47312.3***
(3.57)
16.13***
(2.83)
1.437
(0.34)
5790.1**
(-2.43)
Yes
Yes
0.692
3038
35.332

44995.7***
(3.56)
22.38***
(5.69)
1.336
(0.34)
-481.7***
(-3.71)
Yes
Yes
0.729
3038
649.978

56598.1***
(4.36)
26.77***
(6.76)
-0.471
(-0.12)
65.72
(0.19)
Yes
Yes
0.723
3038
292.874

Five Lags Income Ratio Destination
Distance
Distance2
Five Lags Unemployed Origin
Five Lags Unemployed Destination
Five Lags Population Origin
Five Lags Population Destination
Five Lags Education Level Origin
Five Lags Education Level
Destination
Five Lags Crime Origin
Five Lags Crime Destination
Constant
Region Fixed Effects
Period Fixed Effects
R-squared
Observations
Underidentification test

Migration Flows
0.968***
(257.8)
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Chi-sq(2) P-val
Weak identification test
Sargan statistics
Chi-sq(1) P-val
Number of regions

0.000
17.868
0.001
0.976
20

0.000
491.133
0.450
0.502
20

0.000
171.958
0.383
0.536
20

t statistics in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Second Chapter
Figure 1. Foreign Residents in Italy, 2007-2016. (author’s elaboration on ISTAT data).
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Figure 2. Inequality in Italy – Gini Index, 2007-2016. (author’s elaboration on ISTAT data).

Table 1. Immigrants Groups by Macro-Region of Destinations
Immigrant Group

Total

North-West (%)

North East (%)

Center (%)

South (%)

Romania

1206938

28.9

21.5

30.8

18.8

Albania

441027

35.3

25.5

26.2

12.9

Morocco

403074

40.7

29.4

15.4

14.5

China

299823

31.7

24.1

31.2

13.1

Ukraine

239424

29.3

24.9

19.5

26.3

Philippines

168292

39.3

13.3

37.5

9.7

India

158055

34.7

24

27

14.2

Nigeria

117358

27.2

28.9

21.2

22.6

Moldova

128979

25.1

51.8

20.2

2.9

Tunisia

95071

26

27.4

16.2

30.3

Poland

94200

13.6

20.1

38.1

28.1
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Table 2. List of Inequality Measures.
Variable

Description

Gini Index

Statistical
measure
of
income
distribution.
The
coeﬃcient ranges from 0 (or 0%) to 1 (or 100%),
with
0
representing
perfect
equality
and
1
representing perfect inequality (within-inequality).

S60/S20

Ratio of the average income of the 40% richest to the 20% poorest.

Standardized GDP per Capita

Statistical measure describing income inequality across the
twenty
Italian
regions
(between-inequality).
Std. GDP per capita = (GDP per capita – Mean(GDP per capita) / Std.
dev.(GDP per Capita)

Table 3. SUR Within-Region Inequality Results

Lagged Gini

Gini Index

Gini Index

0.652***
(0.008)

0.546***
(0.007)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.122***
(0.002)
3420

0.250***
(0.001)
3420

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education

Gini Index

Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

0.098***
(0.002)
3420

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Gini Index
0.549***
(0.007)
0.000***
(0.001)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.122***
(0.002)
3420

Table 4. SUR Within-Region Inequality Results (Two-Years Lag)

Lagged Gini

Gini Index

Gini Index

0.530***
(0.011)

0.368***
(0.008)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.169***
(0.002)
3040

0.254***
(0.001)
3040

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education

Gini Index

Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

0.133***
(0.003)
3040

Gini Index
0.371***
(0.008)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.168***
(0.002)
3040

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 5. SUR Within-Region Inequality Results (Three-Years Lag)

Lagged Gini

Gini Index

Gini Index

0.477***
(0.012)

0.316***
(0.008)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.184***
(0.002)
2660

0.256***
(0.001)
2660

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education

Gini Index

Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

0.149***
(0.003)
2660

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Gini Index
0.319***
(0.008)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.183***
(0.002)
2660

Table 6. SUR Within-Region Inequality Results (S60/S20)

Lagged S60/S20

S60/S20 Index

S60/S20 Index

0.381***
(0.008)

0.362***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

-0.010
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.878***
(0.015)
3420

1.445***
(0.025)
3420

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education

S60/S20 Index

Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

0.853***
(0.015)
3420

S60/S20 Index
0.364***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.011
(0.031)
0.876***
(0.015)
3420

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 7. SUR Within-Region Inequality Results (S60/S20, Two-Years Lag)

Lagged S60/S20

S60/S20 Index

S60/S20 Index

0.246***
(0.006)

0.229***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

-0.007
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

1.049***
(0.016)
3040

1.408***
(0.024)
3040

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education

S60/S20 Index

Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

1.028***
(0.016)
3040

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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S60/S20 Index
0.230***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.021)
1.048***
(0.016)
3040

Table 8. SUR Within-Region Inequality Results (S60/S20, Three-Years Lag)

Lagged S60/S20

S60/S20 Index

S60/S20 Index

0.201***
(0.009)

0.187***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

-0.007
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

1.088***
(0.017)
2660

1.389***
(0.025)
2660

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education

S60/S20 Index

Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

1.074***
(0.017)
2660

S60/S20 Index
0.187***
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.021)
1.087***
(0.017)
2660

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 9. SUR Between-Region Inequality Results

Lagged Std. GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

0.977***
(0.002)

0.963***
(0.002)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-0.004***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)

Lagged Std. Unemp.
Lagged Std. Population
Lagged Std. Education

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

-0.779***
(0.009)
-0.274***
(0.030)
0.438***
(0.030)

0.963***
(0.002)
-0.011***
(0.000)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)

0.000
(0.009)
3420

-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.002)
3420

Lagged Standardized
Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

0.000
(0.002)
3420

0.000
(0.002)
3420

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 10. SUR Between-Region Inequality Results (Two-Years Lag)

Lagged Std. GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

0.955***
(0.001)

0.947***
(0.003)
-0.007***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)

Lagged Std. Unemp.
Lagged Std. Population
Lagged Std. Education

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

-0.763***
(0.009)
-0.274***
(0.031)
0.439***
(0.031)

0.947***
(0.002)
-0.008***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.010)
3040

-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.003)
3040

Lagged Standardized
Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

0.000
(0.003)
3040

0.000
(0.003)
3040

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 11. SUR Between-Region Inequality Results (Three-Years Lag)

Lagged Std. GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

0.953***
(0.001)

0.940***
(0.004)
-0.01***
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.004)
-0.001***
(0.004)

Lagged Std. Unemp.
Lagged Std. Population
Lagged Std. Education

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

-0.764***
(0.011)
-0.272***
(0.032)
0.437***
(0.032)

0.940***
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.004)
-0.001***
(0.004)

0.001
(0.011)
2660

-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.003)
2660

Lagged Std. Foreign
Residents
Constant
Observations

0.001
(0.004)
2660

0.001
(0.003)
2660

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 12. SUR Between-Inequality Model with Net Migration Rate (One-Year Lag)

Lagged Standardadized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

0.971***
(0.003)

0.951***
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.001)

0.006***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
3420

0.003*
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
3420

0.951***
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.003*
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
3420

Lagged Std Unemployment
Lagged Standardized Population
Lagged Standardized Education
Lagged Standardized Foreign Residents
Lagged Net Migration Rate
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 13. SUR Between-Inequality Model with Net Migration Rate (Two-Years Lag)

Lagged Standardadized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

0.947***
(0.004)

0.928***
(0.004)
-0.020***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.002)

0.010***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)

0.007**
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)

0.929***
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.007**
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)

3040

3040

3040

Lagged Std Unemployment
Lagged Standardized Population
Lagged Standardized Education
Lagged Standardized Foreign Residents
Lagged Net Migration Rate
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 14. SUR Between-Inequality Model with Net Migration Rate (Three-Years Lag)

Lagged Standardadized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

0.949***
(0.004)

0.920***
(0.005)
-0.038***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)

0.006**
(0.002)
0.000
(0.004)

-0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)

0.921***
(0.005)
-0.038***
(0.003)
0.004
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)

2660

2660

2660

Lagged Std Unemployment
Lagged Standardized Population
Lagged Standardized Education
Lagged Standardized Foreign Residents
Lagged Net Migration Rate
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 15. SUR Within-Inequality Mixed Model

Lagged Standardized GDP

Gini Index

Gini Index

Gini Index

-0.010***
(0.000)

-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.279***
(0.000)
3420

0.267***
(0.001)
3420

-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.266***
(0.001)
3420

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education
Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

89

Table 16. SUR Within-Inequality Mixed Model (Two-Years Lag)

Lagged Standardized GDP

Gini Index

Gini Index

Gini Index

-0.011***
(0.000)

-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.280***
(0.000)
3040

0.267***
(0.001)
3040

-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.266***
(0.001)
3040

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education
Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 17. SUR Within-Inequality Mixed Model (Three-Years Lag)

Lagged Standardized GDP

Gini Index

Gini Index

Gini Index

-0.010***
(0.000)

-0.008***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)

0.281***
(0.000)
2660

0.267***
(0.001)
2660

-0.007***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.266***
(0.001)
2660

Lagged Unemployment
Lagged Population
Lagged Education
Lagged Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

90

Table 18. SUR Between-Inequality Mixed Model

Lagged Gini

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

-16.271***
(0.605)

-3.890***
(0.456)
-0.550***
(0.01)
-0.155***
(0.024)
0.251***
(0.025)

4.523***
(0.169)
3420

1.082***
(0.127)
3420

-3.838***
(0.454)
-0.552***
(0.01)
-0.155***
(0.024)
0.252***
(0.025)
0.001
(0.002)
1.067***
(0.127)
3420

Lagged Standardized Unemployment
Lagged Standardized Population
Lagged Standardized Education
Lagged Standardized Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 19. SUR Between-Inequality Mixed Model (Two-Years Lag)

Lagged Gini

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

-16.128***
(0.657)

-3.638***
(0.497)
-0.550***
(0.011)
-0.127***
(0.026)
0.219***
(0.026)

4.463***
(0.182)
3040

1.007***
(0.138)
3040

-3.404***
(0.490)
-0.568***
(0.011)
-0.130***
(0.026)
0.228***
(0.026)
-0.009
(0.005)
0.943***
(0.136)
3040

Lagged Standardized Unemployment
Lagged Standardized Population
Lagged Standardized Education
Lagged Standardized Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 20. SUR Between-Inequality Mixed Model (Three-Years Lag)

Lagged Gini

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

Standardized GDP

-16.350***
(0.702)

-3.293***
(0.534)
-0.565***
(0.012)
-0.071***
(0.027)
0.156***
(0.028)

4.526***
(0.195)
2660

0.912***
(0.148)
2660

-3.024***
(0.526)
-0.586***
(0.012)
-0.074***
(0.026)
0.165***
(0.028)
-0.011**
(0.005)
0.838***
(0.146)
2660

Lagged Standardized Unemployment
Lagged Standardized Population
Lagged Standardized Education
Lagged Standardized Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Std. Errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Figure 1. Effects of building damages on internal mobility (No Lags)
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Figure 2. Effects of building damages on internal mobility (Two-Year Lags)
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Table 1. Effect of the 2009 Earthquake and Internal Mobility at the Municipal level
Migrations
Low Building Damage

Migrations

Migrations

0.033
(3.64)

Low-Medium Building Damage

-0.345***
(-7.93)

Medium-High Building Damage

-0.234***
(-6.65)

High Building Damage
Residents
Population Growth
Age Average
Age Average2
Income per Capita
Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Migrations

0.193***
(4.83)
0.359***
(5.97)
18.059
(1.05)
-0.162
(-0.99)
0.001
(0.48)
-1.379**
(-2.21)
-537.949
(-1.19)
456

0.033***
(5.38)
0.357***
(6.29)
9.375
(0.79)
-0.784
(-0.68)
0.001
(0.59)
-1.743**
(-2.16)
-348.372
(-1.13)
456

0.033***
(5.09)
0.334***
(8.78)
10.100
0.84)
-0.0850
(-0.73)
0.001
(0.64)
-1.755**
(-2.15)
-368.950
(-1.18)
456

0.003
(0.74)
0.020***
(4.58)
0.364***
(6.02)
16.351
(0.98)
-0.146
(-0.91)
0.001
(0.62)
-1.513**
(-2.11)
-496.681
(-1.13)
456

t-test in parenthesis
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 2. Effect of the 2009 Earthquake and Internal Mobility at the Municipal level (OneYear Lag)
Migrations
Low Building Damage

Migrations

Migrations

0.018
(1.53)

Low-Medium Building Damage

-0.020***
(-6.42)

Medium-High Building Damage

-0.134***
(-5.84)

High Building Damage
Residents
Population Growth

Migrations

-0.026***
(-7.87)
0.083
(1.25)

-0.018***
(-3.69)
0.082
(1.33)
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-0.018***
(-3.59)
0.083
(1.33)

0.016***
(6.65)
-0.027***
(-7.25)
0.085
(1.29)

Age Average
Age Average2
Income per Capita
Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

25.107
(1.15)
-0.226
(1.06)
0.000
(0.25)
-1.724**
(-2.09)
-611.228
(-1.09)
399

20.062
(1.12)
-0.177
(-1.02)
0.000
(0.29)
-1.942*
(-2.18)
-499.960
(-1.09)
399

20.551
(1.13)
-0.182
(-1.03)
0.000
(0.32)
-1.955**
(-2.19)
-513.332
(-1.10)
399

28.052
(1.13)
-0.254
(-1.06)
0.001
(0.35)
-1.777**
(-2.16)
-685.092
(-1.08)
399

t-test in parenthesis
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 3. Effect of the 2009 Earthquake and Internal Mobility at the Municipal level (TwoYear Lag)
Migrations
Low Building Damage

Migrations

Migrations

-0.025**
(-1.74)

Low-Medium Building Damage

0.028***
(24.27)

Medium-High Building Damage

0.201***
(23.98)

High Building Damage
Residents
Population Growth
Age Average
Age Average2
Income per Capita
Foreign Residents
Constant
Observations

Migrations

-0.044***
(-20.95)
-0.063
(-1.24)
3.809
(0.23)
-0.026
(-0.17)
0.001
(0.86)
-1.266
(-1.63)
-15.448
(-0.04)
342

-0.054***
(-34.55)
-0.057
(-1.29)
11.900
(0.90)
-0.102
(-0.79)
0.001
(0.68)
-0.925
(-1.21)
-200.380
(-0.60)
342

t-test in parenthesis
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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-0.054***
(-35.54)
0.058
(-1.30)
11.458
(0.86)
-0.098
(-0.76)
0.001
(0.61)
-0.88
(-1.15)
-186.628
(-0.55)
342

-0.006***
(-3.45)
-0.044***
(-26.25)
0.067
(-1.29)
4.503
0.27)
-0.031
(-0.20)
0.001
(0.57)
-1.120
(-1.47)
-32.859
(-0.08)
342
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